JORDAN FISCAL REFORM PROJECT II
THE PUBLIC SECTOR DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY

<July, 2010>

This publication was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development.
It prepared by DAI.
JORDAN FISCAL REFORM PROJECT II

The public sector development strategy

Program Title: Jordan Fiscal Reform II Project
Sponsoring USAID Office: USAID/Jordan Economic Growth Office
Contract Number: EEM-I-00-07-00009-00
Order No. EEM-I-08-07-00009-00
Contractor: DAI
Date of Publication: 20th July, 2010

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<tr>
<td>AAP</td>
<td>Annual Action Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSB</td>
<td>Civil Service Bureau</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRP I &amp; II</td>
<td>Fiscal Reform Program I &amp; II</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<tr>
<td>GFMIS</td>
<td>Government Financial Management Information System</td>
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<td>GPA</td>
<td>Government Performance Assessment Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>HR</td>
<td>Human Resources</td>
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<tr>
<td>HRMIS</td>
<td>Human Resources Management Information System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICT</td>
<td>Information &amp; Communication Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IWOMS</td>
<td>Integrated Work Management System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KACE</td>
<td>King Abdullah Centre for Excellence</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOPSD</td>
<td>Ministry of Public Service Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M&amp;E</td>
<td>Monitoring &amp; Evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“MDA”</td>
<td>All Ministries, Departments &amp; All Government Agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOICT</td>
<td>Ministry of Information &amp; Communication Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOU’s</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTFF</td>
<td>Medium Term Fiscal Framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NA</td>
<td>National Agenda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NITC</td>
<td>National Information Technology Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPP’s</td>
<td>Public Private Partnerships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SG</td>
<td>Secretary General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDI</td>
<td>Service Delivery Improvement Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSBs</td>
<td>Shared Services Bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my appreciation to all the Officials and Interviewees listed in Appendix 2 for their time, consideration and information provided during our meetings.

I also give sincere thanks all the Directors and Secretary General of MOPSD and the GPA for their extensive inputs and involvement in reviewing the Strategy and the Implementation Plan, namely :: Badreih Bilibisi Director, HR Policy Development MOPSD :: Mohammed Al-Dwari, Director, Streamlining Department MOPSD :: Sana Saleem Khair, Director Service Delivery Department MOPSD :: Mowafaq Al-Hajaj, Director, Monitoring and Evaluation Unit, MOSPD :: Anas Haddad, Ministerial Advisor MOSPD :: Waleed Farhan, Executive Director, Government Performance Administration :: His Excellency Dr Ali Drabkah, Secretary General MOPSD.

The ROG project team and MOPSD Counterpart that supported me so well with research and guidance, deserve special thanks and mention. They are Widad Qutaishat, Ruba Kajo, and Eman Al ajaleen of the ROG team, and Siham A. AL-khawaldeh my counterpart from MOPSD.

Finally my sincere appreciation goes to His Excellency Minister Imad Fakhoury for his guidance, clear insights and the vision he has developed for a Results Oriented Government, in the Kingdom of Jordan.

Charles Wright – DAI Consultant - July 2010
PART I: INTRODUCTION AND THE NEED FOR REFORM

1. Jordan’s National Agenda Document starts off with the following statement:

   “Past efforts to reform the Public Service have provided much to build on, but they did not go far enough; and were not always sustained for long enough. A major step change is now needed, building on past efforts, to develop a public service that is focused on delivering results, and founded on merit. Many improvements are needed to structures and Functions, management systems and working procedures. Above all, Jordan needs to develop the capacity and motivation of Public Servants themselves.”

2. The objective of this document is to provide the ‘major step change’ strategy and its roadmap, and the interventions and indicative investments that will be required to deliver the challenging desired reforms.

3. The study forms part of the USAID funded Fiscal Reform II, and comprises a key activity under the Component of Results Oriented Government. The study took place in June 2010 under the auspices of the Ministry of Public Sector Development.

4. The need for reform flows from a set of well understood factors as follows.

5. Globalization is having a profound impact on almost all countries and societies, benefiting some and harming others. Trade barriers will continue to come down, and economies continue to open up, thus creating ever increasing global competition. This brings with it the need for greater speed, more efficiency, more innovation and resourceful management in all aspect of economic life, including the Public Sector. All of this creates great change and much pressure on societies, businesses and governments.

6. In addition the way qualified people are managed and remunerated is paramount, as barriers to migration come down, cross border staff mobility rises, creating the prospect of countries losing precisely the scarce skills and intellectual capital that is needed to drive economic development, and attract investment.

7. Jordan, being a country that is not endowed with significant ‘natural assets’, is most vulnerable to these risks of globalization, and the Government fully appreciates this. For Jordan to still be ‘relevant’ in the World in 30 years time, and to climb up the key indicators of development, then it would be helpful if economic growth and development could be accelerated into the 7%-8% trajectory, from the 6% medium term currently projected. The adoption of this strategy could be the uplifting factor.

8. In the meantime Jordan’s Economic fundamentals look reasonably acceptable, given the 2009 recession and the economic bind in which so many countries found themselves.

   - GDP Growth for 2009 was low at 2.8% but in the three years prior to that it was a strong average of 8.3%.
   - The budget deficit in 2009 was 8.9% of GDP, again much worse than prior 3 year average of 4.7%. The plan for 2010 is 5%, and the indications are that it could be less than that.
   - Jordan’s total debt is approximately 60% of GDP, right at the limit of its legal cap, and cause for moderate concern. But this is still far below that of many developed and semi developed economies – especially Japan at a record

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1 Per the National Fiscal Economic Social Strategy 2010 – 2013, issued by the Ministry of Finance

2 All Data in this paragraph extracted from Ministry of Finance – Central Government Finance Bulletin – February 2010.
200%, and it has also dropped sharply from the 102% in 2003/4. The USA currently also stands at 60%, and is intent on reducing this level.

9. **A recent risk emerging is the growing prospect of a global ‘double dip’ recession, as**
   - Some of the Mediterranean countries in the EU find themselves under high debt stress, having no choice but to invoke severe cuts in public expenditure
   - All the major EU Countries also invoking large austerity cuts in public expenditure – but voluntarily, and
   - The US housing market and job market indicators reportedly being unexpectedly negative.

If this double dip recession comes about, then Jordan faces the prospect of a second dismal year economically.

10. **Once again the Government is fully attuned to all this, and fully cognizant of the fact that if the 7% - 8%+ growth rates are to materialize and be sustained, and Jordan is to become increasingly prosperous, then one of the first steps is for the Public Sector to strengthen the foundations of the economy by:**
   - Improving its output performance and delivering its portfolio of programs (currently numbering 2300) on time, with outputs being ‘fit for purpose’ ³
   - Improving service delivery and value for money
   - Ensuring major infrastructure projects are being well executed, on time and on budget.
   - Ensuring the business climate is made increasingly competitive, and attractive to investors.
   - Increasing the involvement of the Private sector in the development of the economy

11. **To achieve all of this requires a major step change in how the Public Sector is organized and managed, in its systems and procedures, in the capacities and productivity of its staff, the further utilization of information technology, as well as improvements in governance. This Public Sector Strategy document attempts to point the way, while recognizing the social responsibilities of Government.**

12. **The downside threat of failure is that if Government fails in its reform endeavor, Jordan will face increasing global marginalization in the decades ahead, potentially falling on the wrong side of the great and shifting ‘global divide’ between successful and unsuccessful States. The prospect and need for successful and serious reform this time around is therefore a compelling one. No more ‘half hearted’ attempts, no more ‘tinkering’, it’s time to get serious about a ‘step change’ in transforming the Public Sector.**

**Methodology and Approach**

13. **The methodology used in developing this strategy was straightforward, including a plethora of document reviews, data and web site reviews, and semi-structured interviews with key Ministry and Agency leaders and staff. Due to time and resource constraints it was not possible to independently and completely verify all the information from the interviews, but they were validated through a process of detailed review by the Departmental Directors of the MOPSD. In addition they do draw on similar findings and conclusions from other analyses such as the recent UNDP and World Bank mission reports, and the Public Sector Development Strategic Plan 2009-2013, prepared by MOPSD.**

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³ “Fit for Purpose” This means that Outputs (from activities / projects / services) are:
- Compliant with Specifications, and of Satisfactory Quality
- Being Used as envisaged, and Sustainable
- Appreciated by the User / Citizen
The approach adopted was to define and agree with the Ministry a framework of five central pillars of reform, plus two enabling ones – seven in all. The fact finding and analysis, and the design of the proposed interventions, was then conducted around these seven pillars. The intention has been to draw together all the ‘pieces of the puzzle’ of PSD that exist within the eight core Institutions driving PSD, and to present a single, complete and coherent Strategy.

Structure Of The Report

15. The structure of the report naturally follows the seven pillars which are as follows:
   1. Streamlining: Mandates, Functions and Structure
   3. Management, M&E and Accountability
   4. Human Resources Management and Development
   5. Service Delivery Improvement
   
   The two Enabling Pillars are
   6. Information Technology, including e-Government
   7. Governance and Legislation

16. Each pillar has a separate section, and the analysis and recommendations are presented in the following sequence:
   1. Strategic Goal of the Pillar
   2. The Situational Analysis – This sets out the main findings & conclusions of the status quo
   3. The Detailed Strategic Objectives - This shows the ideal status of where GOJ needs to get to, indicating the extent of the desired reforms
   4. The Strategic Interventions - to achieve the Vision

17. Wherever a Strategic Objective or Intervention may be unclear, then explanatory text is provided as appropriate. Note too that the Strategic Objectives and the Strategic Interventions incorporate the ‘best practices’ that are relevant to the current Jordanian situation.

18. The report ends with two final sections:
   - Key Implementation Considerations
   - Next Steps

19. The study attempts to minimize the use of obscure acronyms, but there is one that is used frequently, namely “MDA” = Ministries, Departments, Agencies. This acronym covers the multitude of 145 Government entities i.e. the 25 Ministries, 12 advisory boards and all the other agencies classified under 13 more typologies (plus a further four ‘singular’ typologies, making 17 in total). The other acronyms used are listed in the front of the document.

Overview Of The Contents

20. There is a lot to be done in all seven Pillars. However the central responsible MDA’s are well aware of many of the interventions required, and many of these interventions, particularly the more important ones, are well underway.

21. Despite this these interventions are incorporated into the Strategy document in order to create a single holistic view of the complete strategy. Overall, across the seven pillars, there are 33

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4 Per the MOPSD detailed GOJ Organization Structure – July 2010
proposed interventions to be implemented. Most fall into the “no surprises” category – dealing with the conventional wisdom of reform.

22. **However there are three proposed interventions that are new, and if implemented correctly, should prove to be the catalytic driver of change in this 2011 – 2017 reform process. In a nutshell the three interventions are**

- The introduction of an “Integrated Work Management System” – which proactively manages the timely execution of all classifications of Government work (not just programs/projects), as opposed to relying on traditional ‘post event’ monitoring. The last step of the system is to ‘measure/grade’ the performance of each MDA (see Pillar 3).
- The introduction of a unified government-wide Performance Pay System, at the departmental / unit level. Such a proposal is entirely feasible as it is based on the audited ‘performance scores’ generated from the above system. (Pillar 4)

The rationale and justification of these interventions is provided under the referenced Pillars. They have the potential to be the big catalytic “change drivers” which build momentum and drive the implementation of this strategy to a successful outcome.

**PART 2 : THE ADMINISTRATION’S FUTURE STRATEGIC DIRECTION**

23. **The future strategic direction is determined by a statement of the Vision, the Mission, and Strategic Goal of the Public Administration of Jordan, plus the Core Values to be instilled, and the Primary Stakeholders. These were developed as part of the 2009 – 2013 Strategic Plan and subsequently updated after the appointment of the incumbent Minister of MOPSD, HE Minister Imad Fakhoury. They are repeated follows.**

**Vision**

24. **Results-oriented government administration, heading to the citizen, working efficiently and effectively**

**Mission**

25. **“Empowerment of sectors and ministries and government departments to focus on core functions and responsibilities and to prepare as well as implement of system policies and procedures that reflect national priorities. By reviewing and building the organizational structure of the public sector and improve its services and the development of human and financial resources, based on the standards of excellence and mechanisms to promote the principles of accountability and transparency as well as decentralized approach, and partnership with the private sector**

**National Goal**

26. **To have better government for better results**

**Core values**

27. **These are**

1- Integrity, justice, transparency, and equality
2- Believe in change, development, and constant improvement
Public sector development partners and their responsibilities

Public sector development task is the responsibility of all components of public administration in Jordan. In addition, there are other stakeholders such as the parliament and private sector. However, responsibilities differ depending on the role played by the respective stakeholder. Such roles can be classified into two types. Type one: draw up policies, lead development efforts, provide technical support, motivate development initiatives, and create appropriate environment for development program implementation. Type two: program implementation and sustainability. Accordingly, under this strategy, a number of bodies were defined to play integrating roles impacting all public departments in terms of public sector development initiatives. These bodies represent a coherent sector called public sector development sector.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Responsibilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1   | MOPSD        | • Run public sector development programs
|     |              | • Draw up public sector development policies
|     |              | • Follow up with program and project implementation |
| 2   | CSB          | Help develop and implement HR policies |
| 3   | NTI          | Help develop and implement institutional capacity building policies |
| 4   | GPA          | Evaluate and follow up with public performance |
| 5   | MOICT        | Implement E-government Program\(^5\) |
| 6   | KAEC/KAA     | Motivate public institutions to develop their performance\(^6\) |
| 7   | MOF          | Improve expenditure efficiency, sources of revenue, and realize financial stability |
| 8   | MDAs         | Follow up with and implement public sector development programs |
| 9   | MOPIC        | Partner |

\(^5\) MOPSD and MOICT cooperate in implementing the program in terms of improving coordination regarding public service reengineering program conducted by MOPSD before being automated by MOICT and E-government Program.

\(^6\) An MoU was signed with KAEC so that KAA outputs would represent inputs for MOPSD activities.
PART 3 – THE TECHNICAL CONTENT

30. This Technical Section deals with the Seven Pillars of Reform, in the following sequence:

1. Streamlining: Mandates, Functions and Structure
3. Management, M&E and Accountability
4. Human Resources Management and Development
5. Service Delivery Improvement
6. Information Technology, including e-Government

31. The analysis and recommendations of each Pillar are presented in the following sequence:

1. Strategic Goal of the Pillar
2. The Situational Analysis
3. The Strategic Objectives
4. The Strategic Interventions - needed to achieve the Objectives

Pillar 1 – Streamlining: Mandates, Functions, Structure and Size of Government, including Sectorization

1. Strategic Goal
   - A well structured Public Administration, containing an optimum number of Ministries and Agencies, all with clear distinctive mandates, organized into an effective Sector-based Framework.

2. The Situational Analysis
   1. The Government Structure presently comprises 145\(^7\) Institutions classified in 17 Different Typologies. There are 24 Ministries with 70 reporting entities, plus the Prime Ministry with 42 direct (and 8 indirect) reporting entities. It is well established and accepted that this overall structure has become overly cumbersome and unwieldy, and this issue has been the subject of more than one consultancy study recently. Of interest is that the well regarded Public Administrations of Singapore and Ireland have only 14 Ministries, the USA has 13, and Singapore only has three typologies of Government Agency
   2. In addition, situations arise where
      - Different typologies of Agency perform the same function eg the respective regulators of Public Transportation, of Marine Transport, of Standard & Metrology are respectively a Commission, an Authority, and an Institute.
      - Different Commissions have different Governance arrangements, and the related laws lack uniformity.
      - A new entity is set up, without sufficient thought being given to whether the service or the need could be fulfilled by widening the mandate of an existing entity
   3. The Prime Ministry faces a particularly untenable position, with its 42 reporting entities. Firstly 42 separate entities is too large a number for an effective level of oversight, and secondly some confusing oversight arrangements arise where for example the Electricity, and the Telecommunications Commissions report to the Prime Minister, and not to their relevant sector Ministries.
   4. Finally, situations arise where a series of Agencies exist, all inter connected to a sector - for example four agencies all related to the Media - but there is no ‘umbrella organization’ to coordinate the efforts. This again leads to the need for rationalization.

\(^7\) Per the MOPSD detailed GOJ Organization Structure
5. This highly fragmented structure and complex reporting relationships, has led to several cases of overlapping mandates, causing duplication, confusion, ‘turf’ disputes (causing lack of cooperation), and therefore inefficiency. It is also bound to cause problems with communication – i.e. “left hand / right hand” confusion between Institutions, simply because there are too many fragmented entities in existence.

6. Up until recently each MDA has ‘stood alone’ from a reporting /oversight perspective and was not structurally grouped into any formal Sectoral Structure. However following various studies noted in 1. above, and good analytical work by MOPSD and the GPA Unit, a proposal has now been forwarded to Cabinet which proposes the formation of 16 Sectors and grouping existing MDA’s into this framework.

7. The current ‘stand alone’ arrangement led to the existence of a multiplicity of Committees which are set up to coordinate those fragmented elements which have some commonality of purpose. However these Committees are reported to have sometimes lacked stability and continuity, because of shifting mandates and membership. In addition they sometimes seem to lack the authority to compel member institutions to comply with resolutions, and so progress and coordination can be ‘below par’.

8. The recent 2010 response to this problem has been the Prime Ministry setting up seven Inter Ministerial Committees relating to the Seven Strategic Components of the 2010 Executive Plan of Government, as well as the formation of the Prime Ministry’s “Delivery Unit” to monitor the execution of the Executive Plan, and to ‘problem solve / trouble shoot’ where major ‘slippage’ occurs.

9. There seem to be differing informed opinions about whether or not MDA’s are overstaffed. Some informed opinion says it definitely is, while others say overall it is not, i.e. surpluses in some areas are offset by shortages elsewhere, and its therefore a question of redeployment. The overall staffing position is therefore suboptimum.

10. The split between “front office” staff (i.e. ‘core business’ - technical and service delivery functions), and back office staff (i.e. administration and support) appears to be weighted too heavily in favor of Back Office. Appendix 5 lists a sample of 48 Government entities which submitted data in response to questionnaire from MOPSD regarding staffing levels, and the split between technical and administrative staff. The overall result of the sample showed that the Admin Support staff outnumber Technical Staff in the ratio of 51% to 40%:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Technical</th>
<th>Admin + HR</th>
<th>Unspecified</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>40.42%</td>
<td>51.01%</td>
<td>8.57%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

11. Front office (technical) staff provides service delivery and technical advancement, and therefore ‘add value’. Back office (administrative) staff, while essential, purely adds to the overheads, and the number of these posts should be minimized in order to maximize “overall value for money”.

12. We could not locate comparative data from other countries on this technical/administrative split. However Government is in the business of providing Services, not in the business of Administration, so it seems reasonable to assume that the ratio should at least be the other way around. This would conceptually entail an aggregate 22% shift away from administrative jobs into technical jobs – an interesting challenge.

The size of Government

13. There are 208 000 Public Sector employees\(^8\), which is approximately one employee for every 5-6 families, or roughly 3% of the population, and 13% of the total workforce\(^9\) - excluding the military. This is not unduly high, as some of the developed countries, with large social sectors, often have more than double that (they can afford it). In semi-developed countries this indicator is approximately within the ‘normal range’, but at the same time some Governments now think they are overstuffed and inefficient and are taking steps to reduce their numbers. Jordan needs to review this issue.

14. Added to this figure is the number of daily paid ‘casual’ workers who do not feature on the “job manning table”. According to the CSB, the figure climbed to as high as 30 000 in 2005, but has since been substantially reduced to 5000.

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\(^8\) Information provided by CSB

\(^9\) Total Workforce is 1 667 000, per CIA Factbook - Jordan
15. The growth in the Civil Service in the last five years has totaled 18.7%, which is well above the population growth rate of in the same period of approximately 12% (i.e. by approximately 56%). This has lead to a situation where the 2009 Government expenditure of JD 5.976 bn is 37% of GDP. Put another way the Total GDP is only 2.7 times Government expenditure. According to an internet ranking table, Jordan’s Government expenditure, as a % of GDP was the 45th highest out 160 countries in the survey, which in percentage terms is top 28%. This level of expenditure “crowds out” the Private Sector, which is generally far better at generating economic growth than is Government.

16. The budget deficit has now reached about 10% of GDP in 2009, partially as a result of the Global recession causing a reduction in tax revenues, and needs to be reduced. Revenue collections this year are under pressure, and expenditure will have to be similarly constrained. One of the choices facing the Government is whether to have a leaner more professionalized Civil Service, who are paid at higher levels, or whether to continue with the status quo.

17. However it is important to bear in mind that in carrying out the restructuring, is essential to carefully consider which functions and services the government must continue to perform (and the level of access) and which should be outsourced to private sector, or abolished. Once that is decided then it is possible to move forward on establishing appropriate staffing levels.

Conclusion

18. The overall conclusion therefore is that the Structure of Government, as represented by the number and fragmentation of Ministries and Agencies, and the related mandate overlaps, is cumbersome, has become unwieldy, and is therefore inefficient. In addition the size / number of employees in the Public Sector, needs to be reviewed and optimized, as does the split between Technical and Administrative staff.

3) The Detailed Strategic Objectives

The Government of Jordan needs to adopt the following Strategic Objectives:

1. To rationalize and significantly reduce the number of MDA’s (and the number of Typologies), and reorganize them into a Sector framework, from a Policy, Oversight and Implementation perspective.

2. To ensure the restructuring takes fully into consideration the roles of Policy Formulation, Regulation/ Inspection, and Execution / Service Delivery, and eliminates overlaps.

3. To revise the mandates of the MDA’s accordingly, and create the appropriate Sector Legislation. The legislation should, inter alia define the Sector’s constituent institutions, create the Law and Bylaws for such institutions, which follow a standardized content and governance framework – which may vary for each typology.

4. To “right size” the MDA’s and ensure they are now staffed by an appropriate staff establishment, working efficiently, to fulfill their mandates, with an appropriate split between technical and administrative staff.

5. To develop appropriate solutions and policy regarding how to deal with surplus staff, possibly an early retirement incentive, or some form of transitional redeployment arrangement.

6. To reduce the deficit to 3% of GDP and borrowings to less than 56% of GDP by 2013

Note that these Strategic Objectives encapsulate relevant ‘best practices’ that are currently applicable to Jordan’s environment and its stage of development. This statement holds true for the remaining six Pillars which follow.

4) The Strategic Interventions

10 Per CSB Strategic Plan 2010 -2013
11 Per All Data in this paragraph extracted from Ministry of Finance – Central Government Finance Bulletin – February 2010
12 Per Table listed at www.onepigone.blogspot.com
13 Per the National Fiscal Economic Social Strategy 2010 – 2013, issued by the Ministry of Finance
The intervention required to deliver on the Objectives are as follows:

**Intervention 1 – Restructuring**

1. Phase 1 - Commission the next phase of the Restructuring Program which will lead to the rationalization of all Ministries, Departments and Agencies. The program needs to commence with a major study (or studies involving several Sector Specialist Firms) incorporating the following elements:
   - Reviewing the mandate roles and functions of all MDAs
   - Identification of duplication and overlaps
   - Proposals for Rationalization
   - Formulation of revised mandates, roles, functions of all ‘restructured’ MDA’s
   - A review and rationalization of the number of Agency Typologies
   - Develop criteria which determine whether Agencies are eligible to be classified as “Autonomous”
   - Endorsement of the Sector Categories, and proposals for allocation of ‘restructured’ MDA’s into Sectors
   - Proposals for the Governance arrangements of Sectors, particularly the role and mandate of Sector Coordinating Committees – See Pillar 7 Governance.
   - Identification of services that are suitable for commercialization (PPPs), services that could be dropped, and a set of related proposals
   - Review of the Staffing Standard (Staffing Levels) required to fulfill revised mandates and functions, incorporating proposals on optimizing the “technical (service delivery) / administrative split.
   - Proposals for how to deal with the staff surpluses that may arise. Note that this point, and the one above (Staffing Standard), falls under the jurisdiction of the HRD Department in MOPSD, and will be executed by them.
   - Identification of all the legal and regulatory issues that need to be addressed, followed by the drafting of such laws and regulations. This should minimally include creating the appropriate Sector Law which defines the Sector’s constituent institutions, creates the Bylaws for such institutions, which Bylaws follow a standardized content and governance framework.

   - Note: This study has already been conceptualized, terms of reference prepared.

2. Phase Two – Phased Implementation by Sector of the many changes involved, details of which are provided in the implementation plan.

**Intervention 2 – Regulatory Procedures and Tools**

- Once the Regulatory Entities have been set up, and their mandates established, the next step is to ensure that each Entity develops its Regulatory Policy, Procedures and Tools (mainly the Inspection Manual), provides training to its staff, and commences its Regulation and Inspection regime.

**Pillar 2 – National Planning, Budgeting, Financial Management**

1. **Strategic Goal**

   - All Public Expenditure budgets are allocated in accordance with the priorities spelt out in a single guiding National Development Plan (currently the National Agenda), they are affordable (determined by the MTFF), and expenditure is properly managed, controlled and accounted for.

2. **The Situational Analysis**

   **Planning**

   1. While the National Agenda has been in existence since 2005/6, and it has a lifespan of 15 years, there was apparently some difficulty in the early stages in getting it to take root, and to guide the totality of planning, development and resource allocation in Jordan. This has been partially because it is in the nature of Jordanian MDA’s to protect their autonomy if they so wish, and partially because it takes time for such a authoritative document to be fully understood and adopted.
2. In 2007 the Ministry of Planning issued its planning document called The National Executive Plan covering the period 2007-2009, which ostensibly was derived from the National Agenda. At the end of the 2009 period, the Prime Ministry issued the Executive Plan of Government 2010, and set up associated M&E procedures.

3. The Ministry of Planning is now using this year to prepare the next phase of the National Executive Plan 2011 – 2013, and to once again take the Planning driving seat. It has prepared detailed planning templates and instructed 24 Ministries (as ‘notional Sector Leaders) to complete the documents which involves ‘inter alia’ the listing, phasing and budgeting for all planned projects / programs.

4. Given that this planning documentation is in Arabic, and the very short time available, it has not been possible to determine to what extent this planning effort will conform to the National Agenda. Nevertheless, subject to this proviso, the Planning function now appears to be heading back on track, with a single unified planning document emerging.

5. Most Ministries (as head institution of the notional/temporary 23 Sectors), should have by now developed their Strategic Plans in a standard format, having also incorporated key aspects of the plans of subordinate Agencies.

6. Assurances have been given that these 23 Plans will be reviewed for National Agenda compliance, and that sign off by the Steering Committee overseeing the process will effectively mean compliance is intact. Assurances have also been received that the Steering Committee will review the totality of the program/activity budgets to ensure they fall within the relevant MTFF.

7. The overall impression therefore is that up to now there have been too many plans (and possibly too much planning), which have
   - Not necessarily all been pulling in the same direction
   - Not ensuring that effort and scarce resources have been focused on a common set of National Priorities
   - Been diverting effort and attention away from the even more critical task of execution.

8. However recently the Ministry of Planning has refocused and taken charge of the planning effort, and the plans and programs emerging will ostensibly be NA compliant and budgets will be within MTFF limitations.

Budgeting

9. The Budgeting function and process has been, and continues to be, the subject of ongoing major reform, bringing systems and procedures into line with Best Practice, under FRP I and II. These reforms comprise the introduction of the discipline of Medium Term Fiscal Frameworks, and more recently, with the introduction of Result Oriented Budgeting. Both initiatives, once fully imbedded, will have a major positive impact on fiscal discipline and the efficacy in budget allocation. This will especially be the case once the loop is closed between Planning, the MTFF and ROB.

Financial Management

10. Similarly the Financial Management function has been undergoing major reform with the investment in the Oracle based Government Wide Financial Management System, under FRP I & II. This system is scheduled to complete its (extended) acceptance testing program in October, with the first site implementations commencing shortly thereafter. The project has
fallen behind its planned optimistic schedule, having experienced some configuration and customization issues. However all parties concerned are working hard to ensure the issues are resolved, and that further delays are minimized.

11. The Ministry of Finance Project Team is apparently not using effectively a project management methodology for guiding the way the project is managed, such as PRINCE II – which is a “best practice” methodology designed specifically for ICT implementation projects in the Public Sector. The Ministry is apparently relying on the Systems Implementer to manage the project, which it appears is not being done sufficiently well. Complex ICT implementation projects produce best results when the User’s Project Implementation Team (who have ultimate responsibility for success) fully adopt the rigor of PRINCE – or equivalent, independently of the Systems Implementer. Such rigor entails, inter alia, systematically managing and resolving with the Implementer, the many “Issues” that invariably arise - in a timely manner – as well as fulfilling the User’s many less visible obligations which help create a successful project.

12. The overarching Accounting Policy still in use is Cash Accounting as opposed to Accrual Accounting (both are catered for within Oracle). Cash accounting is a rudimentary method that does not provide a substantive Balance Sheet and therefore there is no recognition and accounting for the Government’s Assets and Liabilities – a major reform.

13. In addition there are no meaningful Fixed Assets registers, and control over the security and utilization of assets is therefore below par.

14. Although there is still a long way to go, once the Oracle system is successfully implemented across all MDA’s, and the Accrual Accounting Policy is adopted, the FM function will be at “Best Practice” level.

3. The Detailed Strategic Objectives

The Government of Jordan needs to adopt the following Strategic Objectives:

1. To confirm the Ministry of Planning has prime responsibility for coordinating the entire planning effort across all of Government.

2. To review and endorse the National Agenda as being the foremost National Development Plan, and all subsidiary planning documents – short and medium term – at the Sector level and the Institutional level - are congruous with its direction and priorities.

3. To ensure that the SECTORS defined in Pillar 1 above, prepare “Sector Investment Plans” through whatever Oversight Body is created. Such plans need to fall within the MTFF ceilings which govern the first three years (and then fall within assumed growth rates for subsequent years)

4. To ensure that the Activities specified and costed in the Planning documents (ie the Annual Action Plan), fall within MTFF ceilings, and these Activities are the ones that subsequently appear in the ROB system.

5. To ensure the Budgeting (Results oriented) and Financial Management Reforms are fully implemented and working effectively, including the adoption of Accrual Accounting throughout Government.

4. The Strategic Interventions

The interventions required to deliver on the Objectives are as follows:
1. **Planning Mandates**

The Institutional Review of Mandates (Pillar 1) will address and resolve the issue of overlapping mandates between the Prime Ministry and the Ministry of Planning. This is a key issue to be resolved. The mandate review should confirm the responsibilities of the Ministry of Planning, and institutionalize the preparation of Sector Investment Plans.

2. **Budgeting and Financial Management**

Given that comprehensive major reform processes are well underway in Budgeting and Financial Management, there is not much new here. The interventions are to complete the Fiscal Reforms already underway under the FRP II program, relating to:
   a) Results Oriented Budgeting,
   b) Tax and Customs reform,
   c) Financial Management System
   d) Complete the conversion to Accrual based Accounting

However the GFMIS Systems Implementation process can and should be strengthened.

*Note: None of these interventions will appear separately in the Implementation Plan they are embodied in other Interventions already underway and budgeted. They are therefore not allocated ‘Intervention Numbers’*

### Pillar 3 - Management, M&E and Accountability

1. **Strategic Goal**

The ‘Work of Government’, and the deployment of its employees, is managed in a proactive and professional manner, such that the progress, performance and outputs of its Ministries and Agencies come under frequent scrutiny, in order to achieve and be accountable for optimum results.

2. **The Situational Analysis**

Work Management at the Institutional Level

1. There is no rigorous systematic process for proactively managing the deployment of resources (people, assets and finance) to ensure MDA Annual Action Plans (AAP) are executed:
   - on time, ie on schedule
   - at fair cost
   - and outputs are “Fit for Purpose” 14

2. For example there was no evidence of “Staff Deployment / Planning Boards” where the allocation of staff to activities (current and future) was indicated. (This is not altogether surprising as such “deployment management” is seldom found in Government institutions anywhere)

3. Each MDA Administrative By-law states that the organization should form a management committee of the SG and the directors of that organization and to meet periodically and monitor

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14 “Fit for Purpose” This means that Outputs (from activities / projects) are:
- Compliant with Specifications, and of Satisfactory Quality
- Being Used as envisaged, and Sustainable
- Appreciated by the User / Citizen
the performance and take actions accordingly. However it appears that these committees are not
activated in most MDAs.

4. The task of tracking the execution of Annual Action Plans (AAP) in detail is the responsibility
MDA’s internal Monitoring and Evaluation units. These units prepare progress / tracking reports,
but they tend to contain a lot of narrative, and managerial response and follow up is said to be
somewhat insufficient in some / many cases.

5. Nevertheless, even if M&E, and the related managerial response was optimized, it is a ‘post
event’ monitoring tool, which can only highlight what has, or more worryingly hasn’t, been
accomplished. M&E is not a proactive Management tool, which proactively ensures the optimum
deployment of the MDA’s resources to accomplish its Workplans and Objectives.

6. So far, internal M&E systems seem to have concentrated on the Monitoring / Tracking processes,
and they generally have not yet progressed to evaluating the quality of outputs.

Conclusion

7. The overall conclusion therefore is that generally Managerial procedures and disciplines are not
as strong as they need to be, and that the conventional M&E processes being used are not
sufficient on their own to drive high efficiency, performance and results. As a consequence the
speed and quality of implementation and execution is generally substantially lower than it could
be, and there is scope for considerable improvement.

M&E at the National Level

8. M&E at the National level is a Work in Progress, with a plethora of systems having been put in
place. Note that at present there are approximately 2300 projects in progress throughout
government. The following Institutions have developed various forms of M&E

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9. There is now recognition that there are too many M&E systems in place, that this gives rise to
excessive, duplicitous and burdensome M&E reporting, and that the whole M&E Framework,
and systems need to be rationalized and harmonized, so that respondent MDA’s only have to
to supply activity progress data / inputs into one central database. A task force of representatives
from the four entities has been set up to do just that.

10. At this point National M&E systems have not yet developed to the point where

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15 Information supplied by the Delivery Unit in the Prime Ministry

16 The GPA and the MOPIC are apparently monitoring the same Plan and Indicators
11. The overall conclusion is that, except for the issue of four national M&E systems (which is shortly to be resolved), a lot of effort has been expended in M&E and fair progress seems to have so far been made. However there is still some way to go before the National M&E function is optimally efficient and effective, with MDA’s submitting only one set of progress reports into a single unified system, from which the various M&E Entities extract data for their respective purposes.

Accountability

12. MDA’s are subject to four key Accountability Instruments
   - The MDA’s Annual Audit conducted by the Audit Bureau
   - The MDA’s Annual Report, prepared internally
   - The KACE Assessment conducted in 18 month cycles
   - The Ombudsman

13. The Annual Audit is primarily a financial audit, conducted in accordance with internationally recognized standards. Where audit queries arise and audit reports reveal malpractice, respondent Institutions are called to account to explain or defend themselves. However the Bureau wishes to increasingly conduct “Performance Audits” and the adoption of Results Based Budgeting and Accounting will aid in this endeavor.

14. The MDA’s own Annual Report process has good intentions of reporting the accomplishments of the Institution. However there seem to be three drawbacks;
   - The completion of Annual Performance Reports is not yet mandatory.
   - Where reports are prepared there is no comparison of what was achieved with what had been set out in the Action Plan, so what was ‘not done’ is not highlighted, or even apparent.
   - There is no independent review which certifies that what has been reported is indeed factual

The KACE Assessment

15. The KACE Assessment is conducted in 18 month cycles by the King Abdullah Centre for Excellence. It is a credible incentive system for all staff and management levels to spur competition and commitment to excellence. KACE sees its goal as getting members of the public sector to think of themselves as civil servants, not just government employees. It measures institutional and individual performance according to five criteria: leadership, process, knowledge, and human resource and financial management. Unfortunately, scores have so far been low, an indication that there is some way to go before Public Sector Institutions can consider themselves well managed, operating efficiently and effectively.

The Ombudsman

16. The Ombudsman’s office became operational in 2009, and has 50 staff of which only 20 (40%) are technical. The role is a traditional one of investigating complaints made by the Public. As at mid June 2010, the Office had apparently received and investigated 2716 complaints of which approximately 50% had been dismissed without merit, the balance investigated, many of which are in progress. The findings and rulings of the Office are however not legally binding, and as at the time of the interview the annual report for 2009 had not yet been published. Given that the Office will shortly have been in operation for two years, it would seem appropriate and timely that a operations and performance review is carried out.

Overall Conclusion on Pillar 3
17. The overall conclusion is that while there is a reasonably good framework of Accountability in place, there is room for ‘harmonization’, more compliance and more rigor in the application of the Framework. In addition there is much room for improvement regarding the performance being achieved and the results being produced, partially because there is no system to proactively manage the efficient use of resource inputs, i.e. no ‘work management system’.

3. The Detailed Strategic Objectives

Government needs to adopt the following Strategic Objectives which ensure that:

*Integrated Work Management*

1. Each MDA manages its “Work” - particularly the deployment of staff and resources, in a proactive and systematic way.

2. Each MDA improves the speed of implementation and the quality/sustainability of outputs from activities. This will improve Efficiency and Effectiveness, and therefore overall Performance of MDA’s, and the Value for Money they provide.

3. Execution processes are accelerated by deploying an integrated ICT application designed for the purpose. The ICT application should also cover “Recurring Services” typically represented by Service Delivery to Citizens / Businesses, and involving the setting of Minimum Standards of Service Delivery which are monitored frequently. Such a system may usefully be described as an “Integrated Work Management System”. It is described more fully under Intervention 4 below.

*Monitoring and Evaluation*

4. M&E is incorporated into the “Integrated Work Management System” as an integral part of the whole system. The system would eventually be implemented Government wide, scoring the output and outcome performance of all MDA’s. It can and should therefore be developed to consolidate MDA performance as required into a single National M&E system, which monitors and evaluates the implementation of the National Agenda.

*Accountability*

5. The “Integrated Work Management System”, and its “performance scores” are fully auditable from both a performance and even financial perspective, including efficiency, effectiveness and cost. It therefore provides the opportunity bring full accountability and disclosure of performance into being, to be reflected in the MDA’s Annual Performance report, which is audited. It would therefore unify the whole arena of Accountability for Performance and Value for Money. The results could also feature heavily in the KACE awards.

6. The Mandates, Roles and Functions of the ‘Accountability’ Institutions are optimally coordinated, and the performance of the Institutions is ‘above par’

Note: Two of the key issues to resolve in due course, is which Ministry is the Custodian of the System, and how will the critical task of auditing Performance and the Performance scores, be carried out.

4. The Strategic Interventions

The interventions required to deliver on the Objectives are as follows. Note that a cumulative numbering system is applied throughout all seven pillars:

*Intervention 3 - In the short term – Unify and rationalize the National M&E system*

The four Departments / Units involved in M&E have been tasked with developing a unified M&E Activity data base, which requires all MDA’s to enter on line their activity status monthly. From this data base the
various institutions will extract and process data and develop their differing M&E reports, which are tailored to suit their different purposes

**Intervention 4 - Implement an Integrated Work Management System**

Commission, design and implement an “Integrated Work Management System” (IWOMS), which has all the functionality and features required to meet the Strategic Objectives. Key elaboration is as follows.

The system must be comprehensive and uniform across Government and recognize that almost all Government Work can be classified into only three typologies namely

- Planned Activities
- Recurring Activities (both External to the Public, and Internal within MDAs)
- On Demand Activities

The ICT system must

- Provide modules for managing each of these typologies,
- Contain all M&E functionality
- Provide full interfaces with the GFMIS and the HRMIS.

A Diagrammatic Overview of the System is as follows:

The system must importantly evaluate the extent to which outputs and services delivered are “fit for purpose.” 17 The last step of the system is to produce a “performance score” for each department / unit within an MDA, which then enables the introduction of “Performance Related Pay” into the Civil Service Pay Structure – (elaborated under Pillar 4)

**This will be a multi phased activity covering:**

- Planning and Selection of Service Provider
- System Customization and Testing 18
- Pilot Implementation
- Implementation roll out

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17 “Fit for Purpose” This means that Outputs (from activities / projects / services) are:

- Compliant with Specifications, and of Satisfactory Quality
- Being Used as envisaged, and Sustainable
- Appreciated by the User / Citizen

18 Investigations of software available on the market and supported in Jordan, reveals at least one International Package Solution which appears to have most of the functionality required. Early assessment indicates the technical effort to customise the system into full functionality may not be extensive. Two GOJ Entities are already using aspects of the system.
It could last a total of approximately four years, before all MDAs have adopted the system

Note that this IWOM system is implemented into respective MDAs on an “On Demand” basis. This will involve each MDA having to prequalify by passing a “Readiness Assessment”. The Readiness Assessment will involve the MDA having already put ‘its house in order’ in several important respects. This issue is elaborated in detail under Section 4 – Critical Success Factors.

**Intervention 5 – Institutional and Performance Review of Accountability Institutions**

A review to examine the mandates, roles and functions of the three Accountability Institutions, namely the Audit Bureau, The Ombudsman, The Anti Corruption Commission, to ensure they are fully aligned, and to simultaneously conduct a performance and standards review to ensure that ‘good practice’ is being applied.

**Intervention 6 – Performance and Accountability Law**

Promulgate a Performance and Accountability Law which will require all MDA’s to measure their performance in a comprehensive and systematic way, audit and publish the results, and make provision for performance related pay (discussed under Pillar 4). It may also cover the concept of Performance Contracts for Executive Managers. This content may well be incorporated into the Public Sector Development & Government Performance Bylaw 15.
Pillar 4 – Human Resource Management and Development

1. Strategic Goal

To have the right number of people with the right skills in the right jobs, performing well, - while being recognized and remunerated accordingly, in an environment which is conducive to continuous performance improvement.

2. The Situational Analysis

Numbers of Public Sector Employees

1. According to the CSB the Public Service now employs 208 000 staff\(^{19}\), of which 16000 are employed in the Autonomous agencies, plus 5000 casual workers. This represents a growth of 18.7% in the last five years, versus population growth of some 12%, reflecting a growth rate of 56% higher than population growth. This trend exists partially as a consequence of a National belief that the Government has a duty to provide ever increasing numbers of jobs, and reduce unemployment.

Structure, Operations and Institutional Mandates for HR Management

2. The four Institutions which have various oversight roles to play are the MOPSD, The Civil Service Bureau, the Civil Service Council, and the Public Sector Development Ministerial Committee. However it would appear that once again there are overlapping roles, some duplication, and therefore waste and inefficiency. For example all three institutions have a role in Policy development, and CSB and MOPSD both get involved reviewing, and assisting with capacity building initiatives in HR units at MDAs. At the same time there may be insufficient focus on “compliance inspection” regarding the adherence to the Civil Service Bylaw, particularly regarding codes for ‘transparency and fairness’. At times these overlaps and gaps in roles / mandates have led to an element of lack of coordination and cooperation, creating suboptimum outcomes and impacts.

3. Detailed HR Management in MDAs is carried out by the respective HR Departments, who are required to implement the policies, laws, systems, and tools developed in the Centre. These departments are said to lack the capacity, knowledge and skills to operate the HR function at an acceptable professional standard. There is a major effort required to bring these departments up to standard, requiring review, assistance, mentoring and monitoring from the centre.

HR Planning

4. The Civil Service Bylaw (30) 2007, provides adequate policy direction for HR Planning, and is supported by the transparent procedure of ‘Job Manning Tables’ which are reviewed by appropriate Committees. However there is no formal HR Planning methodology which determines recruitment needs from an organization’s mandate and functions. So while there is an annual process of preparing an annual Job Manning Table to form the basis of the HR budget, this is not effective in ensuring that an organization has the right numbers and grades of staff to fulfill its roles and functions.

Recruiting Processes

5. The Civil Service is inundated with tens of thousands of job applications each year, notwithstanding Civil Service remuneration levels being far lower than the Private Sector and Civil Society. The

\(^{19}\) Per CSB Strategic Plan 2010 -2013
reason given is that the Civil Service is seen as a ‘haven’ of job security with low pressure and performance standards. The implication of concern is that the Civil Service may be attracting some lower caliber staff or staff with negative attitudes.

6. The recruiting process has not changed significantly for many years and is substantially based on the completion of a Civil Service entry examination (which tests the applicants level of general knowledge), and academic qualifications (excluding health and education). In addition there is a ‘queuing’ system in place, which determines the next person (or set of persons) in line for interview, irrespective of their precise suitability for the job, other than the basic academic qualification. In addition the applicant is not made aware of what job they are being interviewed for. What therefore has not been done is to specify the knowledge, skills, competencies and experience required for different jobs, and then select only the most suitable applicants from the queue. Hence the recruiting process may often not be selecting the most capable and appropriate applicants, and/or not attracting the best talent from the market.

7. The recruiting process has not changed significantly for many years and is substantially emphasis on level of academic qualifications and knowledge and based on the completion of a Civil Service entry examination (excluding health and education) that are focusing just on testing the level of applicant general knowledge, it does not evaluate the skills, competences and attitudes need for each position. In addition there is a

Job Evaluation and Grading

8. The current job grading structure is founded mainly on the academic qualification of the employee (Degree, Diploma, High School), and length of Service – up to 40 years, which is the basis of automatic time based promotions and increments. This is an outdated system which in no way reflects the relative complexity or demands of any particular job. Best practice requires that each different job type is evaluated according to a Job Evaluation methodology (eg Hay, Patterson etc), which assesses the job demands in terms of a weighted set of agreed criteria eg Knowledge, Skills, Responsibility, Stress etc. The job is then given a grade according to its score. The number of grades that exist in the entire structure are fairly limited, normally 15 – 20. Thereafter a salary structure is designed to establish appropriate pay scales for the different grades of jobs, with appropriate differentials between the grades.

Remuneration Levels

9. Civil Service PAY LEVELS are generally very low, in relation to responsibility, and seem to average at approximately 40 - 60% of the Private Sector, although this is a perception which is about to the subject of a formal survey.

10. Pay levels are based on the outdated grading structure described above, augmented by an elaborate set of allowances, which comprise approximately two thirds of the total cost of remuneration. Pay is therefore not based on systematic evaluation of the complexity and demands of the job as described above, and is overly complex to administer.

11. Pay levels have become very uneven with greatly higher scales being paid to Contract Staff, and Autonomous Agencies, both of which represent the Governments attempt to be able to offer competitive salaries to attract / retain highly skilled key staff (even though higher pay scales then can spill over to the administrative staff of Autonomous Agencies - see additional comment at end of this pillar). In addition some staff are awarded various bonuses and rewards, but the whole bonus system is contentious as it not based on a set of systematic criteria, and applied objectively and uniformly within a framework of fair performance assessment.
12. Remuneration has therefore become contentious and at times difficult to defend. All this impacts negatively on staff motivation and productivity, and apparently a degree of apathy can at times prevail. This does not auger well for a productive efficient Civil Service.

**Promotions**

13. Promotions to fill a more senior vacant position (ie ‘pull promotion’) are not necessarily advertised and are based mainly on the number of years in service, not on an assessment of the candidates experience and his/her ability to perform the higher job. In addition a system of ‘push promotion’ also exists where an employee is ‘entitled’ to a promotion after serving five years in a post, and so a new higher graded post is created to accommodate the individual.

**Training and Development**

14. The Government’s training policy is not being adequately implemented, there is no training strategy, and training is not delivered against a formalized training needs analysis. The whole investment in training therefore seems somewhat haphazard.

15. The NIT advises that the aggregate of all training budgets in the MDA’s was only JD 1 million, and that NIT only receives a grant from Government covering approximately 20% of their expenses. Based on this information, Governments investment in training is inadequate.

16. Last year the NIT trained approximately 6500 Civil Servants, which is approximately 60 a day, assuming the average length of a course is two days. A survey of MDAs conducted by the NIT revealed that a total of only 14500 Civil Servants attended any type of training course, which means that

   - NIT serviced only 45% of the market last year, even though they are considerably cheaper than the Private Sector
   - Out of the approximately 80 000 Civil Servants that are eligible for training (excluding teachers, nurses and other vocational occupations), only 20% received training

17. There seems to be an absence of really good quality Management Development Training, aimed specifically at Public Sector Managers, going through a recognized Certificate level, to Diploma level. Competent properly trained Managers are the backbone of any organization, and the required investment usually provides handsome rewards. The holding of a Public Sector Management Certificate, Diploma or Degree may become a prerequisite to being promoted into managerial grades.

18. With regard to Public Sector Management Degrees (Masters and Bachelors), the opinion was that the degrees on offer are possibly too ‘generic’, with not enough content that is directly relevant to Jordan’s specific situation and its needs. Graduates coming into the Civil Service are therefore not sufficiently oriented to the operating environment specific to the Jordanian Government, and are therefore less effective than they otherwise might be.

19. The overall conclusion is that it appears that there simply is not enough targeted high quality training being carried out and if so, the right skills and capacities are not being developed to enhance the performance of the Civil Service.

**Performance Appraisal**

20. Although Performance Appraisal is covered by the Civil Service By Law, and the system was revised / updated two years ago, the application of the system across MDA’s is variable and inconsistent. The overall perception is that performance appraisal is generally not being conducted adequately, mainly because of the cultural difficulty in candid, rigorous and critical assessment.
Performance Appraisal is therefore not sufficiently effective and is not having the required impact on improving Civil Service output and performance.

**Code of Conduct**

21. A Code of Conduct for Civil Servants has recently been developed, based on best practices that are also applicable in the Jordanian context, and a Code of Conduct ‘Statement’ has been developed. This Code is now ready to roll out.

**Computerization of the HR function**

22. The CSB is in the middle of a major computerization project to implement a comprehensive, integrated HR system built on an oracle platform, with the analysis and programming being done by a Jordanian Oracle-accredited implementation partner. This process was completed at the end of 2009 and the system is tested and ready for implementation. It is expected that the successful implementation of this world class “best practice” system across all MDAs, will greatly enhance the quality, standards, and efficiency of the HR function. Much is expected and much rests on the success of this investment. However an alternative perspective was also expressed that the customization of the system to make it compliant with the Civil Service By Law, may have detracted from the ‘best practices’ functionality of the original system, and may have destabilized it, making it hard to implement. This is an issue dealt with in the recommendations.

23. The system covers all elements of HR Management, will be managed from a central server housed in CSB, with distributed online operation, processing and reporting in all MDA’s eventually, except for the Autonomous Agencies. These Agencies may however request use of the system, at their discretion.

24. The Departments plan is to implement the system in 15 MDA’s per year, over a four year period.

25. The Computerization department in the CSB currently comprises 20 staff, of whom four are senior analysts, the rest more junior programmers. They are expected to implement the system in 15 MDA’s per year (including 2010), into HR environments which are said to generally lack capability and capacity, therefore making implementation more difficult.

26. It is half way through the year and the first site is not yet up and running. It would appear that there may be difficulties and the 20 person resource base for implementation may fall well short of the needs of the implementation phase, both in number and various skill sets. The skill sets required broadly include project managers, system analysts, data base administrators, IT communication specialists, and change management specialists. The 20 person project implementation team seems to lack the number and breadth of skilled/experienced manpower, and the budgets required. It also apparently is not following any project implementation methodology for IT projects (such as PRINCE, or equivalent – see similar comment under Pillar 2 – Financial Management GFMIS). It is possible, that there will be difficulty in delivering the expected outcomes and the step change improvements needed from this major ICT Investment.

**The Autonomous Agencies**

27. These agencies exercise their autonomy heavily in the HR function, especially with regard to salaries and conditions of service, where they are exempt from complying with the Civil Service By Law, and can offer high salaries and benefits, without recourse or maximums. This applies not only to professional and technical staff, but administrative and support staff. They are also somewhat lacking when it comes to good HR systems and procedures, and often the efficiency of the HR Management function is (apparently) below par. Finally the laws or by laws governing these Agencies are reportedly lacking in uniformity of content, and often contain omissions. These issues need to be addressed.
Conclusion

28. Assuming all the findings mentioned above present an accurate picture of the Status Quo, the HR Function and the Staffing position in the Civil Service face some serious challenges, and are in need of substantial reforms. This is not to say that HR is in a state of high stress or near collapse; it is not and it will continue to function as it does - at a suboptimal level. But if the Government is serious about having the right number of people with the right skills in the right jobs, performing well, then there is a lot to be done.

3. The Detailed Strategic Objectives

The Government of Jordan needs to adopt the following Strategic Objectives of ensuring that:

1. In totality, the Public Sector has the right number of people with the right skills in the right jobs, performing well, in accordance with a ‘Code of Conduct’

2. The HR Function is executed and operated from within MDAs, but is regulated, supported and monitored by the Centre, from Institutions with clear and distinctive mandates devoid of overlap. The mandates of the Central HR Stakeholders should cover Policy Formulation, Regulation, Inspection, Systems Improvement, Monitoring, and Capacity Building

3. Policies, Regulations and Systems in use reflect best practices in HR management, particularly with regard to
   - HR Planning,
   - Recruitment
   - Grading and Job evaluation
   - Training and Development
   - Performance Appraisal
   - Promotions

4. In particular, jobs are evaluated and graded more fairly on a basis that reflects the complexity or demands of any particular job, and the salary structure / scales are adjusted accordingly

5. The HR Units in MDA’s have the skills and capacity to operate in accordance with acceptable professional standards

6. The Government remunerates ALL its Public Sector Employees in accordance with a simple understandable and defensible pay policy and system. The Policy and system should recognize four components of a pay package as follows:
   - The basic pay component which is commensurate with the job grade, and covers all normal living costs (and incorporates the present ‘normal’ allowances )
   - An ‘exceptional allowance’ which compensates for exceptional circumstances faced by only certain employees (danger postings, high cost locations etc)
   - Performance Pay. This is the key element discussed and introduced in Pillar 3 above. It is provides the incentive and motivation for employees to produce higher productivity, output and performance – at the departmental level.
   - Occupational Scarcity Premium – This reflects the current market situation regarding National scarcity within various professional and technical occupations. When the scarcity disappears so does the premium.

7. All Civil Servants benefit from appropriate levels of quality training and development which is relevant to their job performance, and enhances their skills and efficiencies. The Government makes the investment required to enable this to happen
8. The entire HR Function is driven and supported by a world class computerized HR system, which is efficiently implemented and fully utilized in all sites.

9. Where Autonomous Agencies are permitted, they are nevertheless obliged to operate within a considered framework of Bylaws.

4. The Strategic Interventions

The interventions required to deliver on the Objectives are as follows:

‘Associated Intervention’- Manning Levels

The reviews of Staffing Standards (Staffing Levels) in MDA’s is incorporated as a key task in Intervention 1 – Restructuring. This task, however, falls under the jurisdiction of the HRD Department in MOPSD and needs to be coordinated and supervised by them.

Intervention 7 : HR Institutional Review

Phase 1 - The four Institutional Reviews, regarding Mandates Roles and Functions and Rationalization of CSC, MOPSD, CSB, and PSD Ministerial Council, while technically falling under Pillar 1 Restructuring, will actually be carried out here as Intervention 7, as the TOR and funding have already been prepared/arranged.

Phase 2 - Thereafter, the question of specifying the Regulatory function, and the development of a Regulatory Policy, Procedures and Inspection Manual, to enforce the Civil Service Bylaw, is to be addressed.

Intervention 8 Implementation of Computerized HR System:

Phase 1 - Commission immediately an independent expert to conduct a Situational Analysis of the HR Computerization project, and produce a detailed report on all that needs to be done to implement a robust HR system across all MDAs (excluding Autonomous Agencies in the first instance).

Phase 2 – The phased implementation of the system. System to also be made available to Autonomous Agencies.

Intervention 9 : Pay Reform. This takes place in 4 Phases:

Phase 1 - Job Evaluation, and Pay Level Review - Commissioning a Major Job Evaluation exercise across the entire Civil Service, giving rise to the new Job Grading Structure. This will first require that full job descriptions are updated for all Job types.

Simultaneously commission an independent survey of comparative remuneration levels in the Public and Private Sectors and Civil Society, to determine extent of the gap in Public Sector pay.

Phase 2 - Salary Structuring- Developing the related Salary Structure Proposal for Basic Pay

Phase 3 - A detailed study on the wider Pay Reform proposals contained in this document (performance pay and scarcity premiums), and the costing of the proposals, followed by approval of the new ‘four component’ system and policy.

Phase 4 - Implementation of the Grading Structure and the new Salary Levels.

Note that if the Salary structure is well applied, then the need for “Autonomous Agencies” to pay above/outside the structure, should fall away – because of the “Scarcity Premium”

Intervention 10 Best HR Practices

One combined study (or a series of smaller ones), to review, revise, and adopt best practice in the following systems and procedures which are currently below best practice:

- HR Planning
- Recruitment
- Performance Appraisal
- Promotions
- Succession Planning
- Training
These best practices should apply to both Central and Autonomous Agencies

**Intervention 11  : Comprehensive HR Policy and Procedure Manual**

**Phase 1:** The development of a single comprehensive HR Policy and Procedure manual (possibly involving several thin volumes) covering all elements of HR best practice. The Civil Service By Law and related Instructions would then need to be amended, and subsequently be incorporated as the last volume of the Manual.  *(Note that the HR Policy itself has recently been reviewed, and may not need to be re reviewed, but it does need to be incorporated into the HR Manual)*

**Phase 2:** The training & implementation rollout of the manual. The manual should also be made available to Autonomous Agencies

**Intervention 12 : MDA HR Assessments and Strengthening**

**Phase 1:** A coordinated series of 60 – 70 assessments of each MDA’s HR Department’s capacity & operations. This may have to be contracted out to external consultants supervised by MOPSD.

**Phase 2:** This to be followed up by delivery of the identified support, capacity building, and mentoring

**Intervention 13 – Strengthen Legal and Human Resource Foundation of Autonomous Agencies**

Conduct a study to develop one Bylaw to cover all Autonomous Agencies, which covers the articles required to regulate the various common functional areas. *(Note that ‘space / flexibility’ needs to be created to allow Remuneration to be dealt with at the ‘Instruction’ Level.)*

**Intervention 14 - Upgraded Training**

**Phase 1 – A Strategic Review of the Training Situation and Needs (both met and unmet) within the Civil Service. To be followed by**

- An assessment of the capacity and performance of NIT.
- Proposal of how the needs should best be met, including the future role and mandate of the NIT, the future role of the Private Sector, and importantly - the future role of Computer Based Training
- From this information, also develop a revised Training Policy.
- The capital expenditure needed, (and phasing), the annual recurrent expenditure requirement, and funding sources.

**Phase 2 – Implementation of Proposals.**

**Intervention 15 – Management Development Certificate & Diploma Course**

There is no need to wait for a Training Needs Analysis to confirm the need for a Management Development Program. A feasibility study can commence in the short term (or linked as a separate task under the TNA) to assess the best options for GOJ, given the plethora of courses – and training methods that are available, including distance / online learning.

**Intervention 16 - Liaison with Universities**

This is to ‘tailor’ part of the curriculum of the Bachelors and Masters Degree in Public Administration to include material that is directly relevant to the Jordanian Government operating environment.

**Phase 1 - Investigate the feasibility of Universities providing ‘tailored’ curricula in Bachelors and / or Masters degrees in Public Administration.**

**Phase 2 – Implement recommendations accordingly**

**Intervention 17 – Implement / Roll out the Civil Service Code of Conduct**
Pillar 5 - Service Delivery to Citizens, including Public Private Partnerships

1. Strategic Goal of the Pillar

All key services provided to Citizens, Businesses, and Institutions, are provided through the most appropriate service delivery channels, in an efficient courteous manner, with minimum inconvenience to the service user.

2. The Situational Analysis

Service Delivery Improvement

1. Bylaw No. (64) of 2006 is the Regulation for Improving Government Services, and it provides the intention and legal framework for such improvement.

2. The responsibility for improving the delivery of services is vested in the Service Delivery Improvement Unit of the MOPSD – set up in 2006, and the e-Government program in the MOICT – set up in 2003. The two institutions have taken the lead in doing this work, and their main accomplishments are

   ▪ The Service Delivery Improvement Unit (SDI) in the MOPSD, has developed a series of Methodologies and Toolkits, which lays the foundations for both its work, and the SDI work to be implemented by MDAs. This unit has also completed, or is working on, 15 SDI projects since its inception in 2006 (See Appendix 4), and spawned a series of initiatives discussed below.

   ▪ The e-Government program has completed 30 core projects, and many more minor ones. (See appendix 3), an admirable achievement.

3. The SDI Unit is impacted by the fact that the unit can only provide their services “on request” from MDAs, and they have no binding legal authority. Requests for support may have been somewhat limited due to general reluctance by many MDAs to subject themselves to the rigor of a reengineering process, then face the change involved, and the awkward possibility of finding themselves with surplus staff.

4. The e-Government program was highly proactive in marketing their services to MDA’s. Although they too have no binding authority, they succeeded in bringing many MDA’s into the program through the continuous follow up, and creating awareness of the importance of developing their services.

5. It is apparent that inter agency coordination and cooperation between the two units was not – and is not yet - what it could and should be, and opportunities to create synergy and momentum have not been developed. This is despite a concept paper and statement of work being developed and incorporated into an inter agency cooperation MOU. However this is not binding and appears not to be working. In addition the e-Government steering committee seems to have lapsed and has not met for several months.

6. However these issues are now somewhat mitigated by the strong relations between the two Ministries at the level of Minister. Nevertheless more proactive cooperation needs to be strengthened on the ground, supported by the revision of the SDI Regulation No. (64) of 2006, which should also deal with the issue. In addition stronger networks and linkages need to be built with the GPA, as well as with key MDAs, and the e-Government steering committee should also be revived.

7. An initiative has commenced to set up Institutional Development Units (IDU) in each MDA, and an official letter of instruction has been sent out by the Prime Ministry. The IDU will be responsible for coordinating the implementation of initiatives in SDI, e-Government, M&E, Strategic Planning, KACE performance improvement, and the Unit may also ‘accommodate’ the Chief Information
Officer (see Pillar 6 – IT). The unit will report directly to the SG or the Minister. So far 16 MDAs have taken steps to implement this structure. More will follow suit.

8. KACE periodically completes Client Satisfaction and Mystery Shopper surveys, and major crosscutting ‘challenges’ have been identified. The SDI Unit have responded by setting priorities of strengthening the Client Front Desk and the Complaints Handling procedure, and they have prepared the Methodologies, held review / validation workshops, and the methodologies are now with the Prime Ministry for approval.

9. A further intervention that is in progress is that of the ‘Service Card’. Each MDA providing services to the Public is required to complete an information template and to post it on their website. The result is the preparation of a service manual (electronic and physical) which sets out the services provided, specifies service levels, and procedures and locations to access the services. So far 60 MDAs have been through this process, but the issue of quality and possible duplication (or gaps) in services has emerged.

10. This process has identified approximately 800 key services offered by MDAs, whereas the e-Government program has identified approximately 3000 services - the information being provided and updated quarterly by the e-gov contact point in each MDA. There is an issue of defining what constitutes a service, to be addressed in the study mentioned below. Note however that the e-government strategy has identified 75 priority services which need to be automated, but these are yet to be discussed with MOPSD.

11. The terms of reference are being drawn up for a study to look at the quality of the Service Cards completed, the possible duplication or ‘gap’ issue, a reconciliation of the differing service numbers of 800 and 3000, and to define a service coding structure. Nevertheless the key issue that emerges is how big the challenge is to systematically codify and then review and reengineer all these services, over time. Note that the ‘reengineering’ task is made all the more challenging in this technological age because of increasing numbers of service delivery channels.

12. Against this background, the planned activities of the two departments for 2010 and 2011 are as follows:
   - SDI – 25 Projects in 10 Agencies, of which four are currently in progress.
   - E-Government - 33 projects relating to the implementation or strengthening of enabling the central architecture.

Note that the e-Government program strategy no longer involves executing e-services projects. They follow up on monitoring the implementation of the e-government national plan and they work on implementing the central architecture. Regarding SDI, the method of implementation is going to change, with projects being contracted out to consultants, under the supervision and quality assurance of the SDI. This issue is elaborated below.

20 Note that the IDU will be key in coordinating and driving all the changes that will emanate from the all reforms being undertaken. This issue is elaborated under Pillar 6 ICT, under the topic of ‘Shared Services’, as well as under Section 4 Risks, under the sub heading of Change Management.

21 The current Service Delivery Channels are 1) Conventional “Over the Counter”, 2) Normal Post 3) Internet e-Government 4) Call Centers 5) Mobile telephones 6) Agency Outsourcing and other forms of Private Public Partnerships. Choosing which channel, or combination of channels to use for each service, is the starting point for the ‘reengineering process.'
13. This level of activity contained in the respective workplans seems modest in relation to the totality of need, yet it is probably realistic in relation to the current constrained resource base. The SDI unit has a staff complement of 10, and the e-Government program is currently at 12, down from the previous level of 20.

14. One approach to address this issue is to redefine the role of the SDI Unit to be a ‘facilitating and monitoring’ Unit, which promotes service delivery improvement though

- Setting policy, and standards
- Providing best practice frameworks, methodologies and tools, ensuring full training and capacity building is in place
- Certifying private consulting firms who demonstrate they are capable of doing reengineering projects
- Ensuring each MDA has developed an SDI Plan, with targeted priority initiatives, having completed a review process.
- Monitoring the major projects being undertaken, giving technical guidance where requested.
- Conducting annual inspections to monitor compliance with the SDI Law

This redefinition process is already underway in MOPSD, and should give rise to much more SDI activity and improvement taking place.

15. A second approach will also become available if and when the Integrated Work Management System comes into being. It will be possible to obligate each MDA which implements the Integrated Work Management System –to undertake a minimum number of process re-engineering assignments each year. This then becomes a factor in the MDAs performance pay award.

16. In addition, the Integrated Work Management System - requires that minimum service levels are specified within the system (for recurring services). If a policy of ‘continuous improvement’ were to be set, this would be an effective mechanism for ensuring that Service Delivery performance is constantly improving.

17. The prospect therefore is that within a 5-8 year time frame all high impact service delivery improvement initiatives should be completed in all MDAs, and service levels should be continuously improving thereafter.

**Public Private Partnerships**

18. PPP’s are intended to engage the Private Sector in providing finance for infrastructure, construction of the infrastructure, and at times the provision of the service itself. The intention is to accelerate and improve the overall speed and quality of infrastructure provision and service delivery. Compared to Privatization, this is a much more extensive and fragmented task, which has many, different, and time consuming challenges. The number of opportunities (including at the Governorate level), are extensive.

19. For PPP’s to be successful, and have a high impact on the development of infrastructure and services in an economy, requires many enablers. In particular it requires the appropriate legal framework, an appropriate and effective institutional framework, plus requisite resources. In addition it requires the adoption of a ‘PPP mindset’ across most of the Public Sector.

20. The Executive Privatization Commission, is the Institution that has been given the PPP mandate. Its role has shifted from coordinating Privatizations (because they are almost all now complete) to seeking out, developing, and executing PPP’s. The Commission is currently concentrating on five Sectors, namely –Housing / Buildings (across all sectors), Education, Health, Municipalities, Transport. Following studies conducted they are working on only nine priority opportunities, but there are plenty more opportunities to be explored and developed.
21. The concerns that have been expressed are that: PPPs are not supported by appropriate law; that the Executive Privatization Commission may need to be ‘rebranded’ /transformed: that the institutional mandate, role and modus operandi may need to be revised: and relationships with other ‘executing agencies’ and key stakeholders defined and implemented. Once all this is done the requisite staffing and resourcing of the Institution can be resolved. Until these foundations are put in place the potential of PPPs to help accelerate the development of Jordan may be constrained.

**Overall Conclusion – Service Delivery**

22. The importance of implementing major and widespread improvements to the delivery of services is well understood throughout Government. An extensive amount of work has been done, both in laying the groundwork for future improvements, and in executing a substantial number of priority Service Reengineering and Automation projects. However despite the accomplishments to date, overall there is still a large body of work that needs to be undertaken with regard to implementing in MDAs the several major initiatives that have been started, and improving levels of service delivery on a wide scale. These challenges are addressed in the implementation plan.

3. **The Strategic Objectives**

The following detailed Strategic Objectives are proposed:

1. Continue to streamline and reengineer the processes, work flows and structures involved in providing key services, and select the most appropriate service delivery channel(s) This is in progress
2. Continue to develop and provide priority e-Government applications to facilitate the interface of Citizens /Businesses with Government departments wherever applicable. This is in progress.
3. Continue to strengthen Service Delivery by rolling out the following interventions to prioritized MDAs in a systematic manner, and then verify quality and effectiveness:
   - Institutional Development units in all priority MDAs
   - The Service Card Initiative
   - Citizen / Client Service Charters
   - Customer Service Desks
   - Customer Complaints Handling
4. To aggressively pursue PPP’s as a mechanism for raising Private Finance for projects and infrastructure, and to deliver services in an optimized manner.

4. **The Strategic Interventions**

The interventions required to deliver on the Objectives are as follows, - not necessarily in order of priority:

*Intervention 18 - Commission a study to do a comprehensive Situational Analysis and Needs Identification, and Implementation Plan regarding PPPs*

**Phase 1:** The importance and status of PPP’s in Jordan’s development, needs to be reviewed and revised to confirm its priority, develop a policy, and strengthen / adapt as necessary the required Institutions.

**Phase 2:** Develop the Legislation

**Phase 3:** Build the capacity
Intervention 19  - Commission a study to assess quality of the Service Cards completed, define and quantify the number services that need codifying, and define and develop a service coding structure. The study should work closely with the SDI and e-Government program to establish common definitions of service and develop a uniform code of services across Government.

Intervention 20 - Rollout the ‘suite’ of SDI Interventions already devised.

This comprises implementing the following interventions in individual MDAs (in batched phases):

- Institutional Development units
- The Service Card Initiative
- Citizen / Client Service Charters
- Customer Service Desks
- Customer Complaints Handling

It will involve identifying MDA staff to be transferred into the Service Delivery Improvement unit, trained in the execution of their new duties, and supported by technical oversight from the Centre. This will in turn accelerate the identification and execution of SDI / e-Government projects in individual MDAs.

Intervention 21 – Implement Service Delivery Improvement Projects in MDAs, including e-Government services

Systematically execute all the identified priority SDI / e-Government projects flowing from intervention 18, using “accredited” consulting firms noted in intervention 20 below.

Intervention 22 - Prepare Consulting Firms to implement SDI Projects

This will involve prequalifying a number of consulting firms who have the capability and resources to execute SDI projects to a high professional standard. Selected consultants will then be put on an SDI training course to teach them GOJ methodologies, and these firms / individuals will become “accredited” implementation partners.

Intervention 23 – Recurring Services

Implement the Government Integrated Work Management System, with particular emphasis on the “Recurring Services” Module. Then obligate each MDA to undertake a minimum number of process re-engineering assignments each year, which becomes a factor in the MDAs performance pay award. Then set a policy of ‘continuous improvement’ on the initial standards that are set, ensuring that Service Delivery performance is constantly improving.

Pillar 6 - Information Technology – including e – Government

1. Strategic Goal

To utilize ICT to the maximum desirable extent in order to

- improve electronic delivery of services to the Public,
- optimize speed, accuracy, and integrity of ‘back office/composite’ support functions,
- present comprehensive accurate information for decision making,
- optimize intra governmental communications in a secure manner
- provide the means to manage and measure MDA performance

2. The Situational Analysis

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23 Citizen Charters – often publicly displayed on a poster, showing the Citizens what courtesy’s they can expect, service levels they are entitled to, how to make complaints etc. The intention is to make Citizens aware of their rights, as well as their obligations. It is an extension to the Service Card Initiative – but simplifying it to Poster size
1. Most of the key components of the government ICT central architecture named as the Enterprise Government Architectural Framework (EGAF) are in place which is essential to enable the government e-services provisioning. The last remaining component is the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) which is under implementation and will be in place within the coming two years.

2. Over 50% of MDA’s are connected to the Secure Government Network (SGN) and the rest will be connected by end of 2011. All the e-government central architecture components are being hosted in the NITC. This paves the way for the implementation of world class ‘centralized/decentralized’ ICT systems – enabled by a single unified platform shared by the whole government.

3. The e-Government program is following up on a National ICT plan, which includes all ICT projects in the government along with their schedules and estimated budget. The numbers of projects is around 310. Overall this system shows 73 projects are on schedule, and 31 projects will finish by the end of 2010.

4. A national broadband fiber network in place covering number of schools around the kingdom, and government entities in Amman only, used as infrastructure for the secure government network. More work is in progress to achieve all government schools and MDA’s

5. A number of shared services are already in place.

6. The largest Government wide ICT projects underway are:
   - GFMIS – Government Financial Management Information System. The system has been developed and is currently being tested before rolling it out across the government.
   - HRMIS – Human Resources Management Information System. The system has been developed, and is undergoing its first pilot implementation. See comments under Pillar 4 HR.
   - E-Procurement – an RFP has been developed to be tendered but is put on hold due to insufficient financial resources.

7. Institutionally the Public ICT Sector comprises
   - the Ministry – MOICT
   - the e-Government program in MOICT
   - The NITC responsible for the deployment of the IT resources in the government including the operations and maintenance of the ICT communication infrastructure, and hosting the e-government operations centre. The role of the NITC is currently under review and expansion, and the intention is that it should eventually be the execution arm of all the IT related matters in the government.
   - the National Broadband Network NBN
   - Remarkably, 85 MDAs have already set up their internal e-Gov units, and have appointed Chief Information Officers responsible for IT strategy implementation. The units will also contain a project manager, security officer, change management officer, content officer, contact centre officer. However few units are fully staffed yet.

8. Under Pillar 1, the rationale for existing structures / units / agencies will be reviewed, and mergers / rationalization may take place. For example there could be a case for merging the NITC and the e-Gov Program and NBN – see above. Sharp clarity will however emerge on the role of Government in developing and regulating the ICT industry in Jordan, and developing ICT adoption / utilization within Government, including e-government, and finally the most appropriate institutional structure to drive all this.

9. The major challenges being faced are reported to be as follows
The e-government program has lost 60% of its staff, from a peak of 40 down to the present complement of 17. To meet its demanding action plan the program needs to more than double its staff numbers, so this is a major challenge and risk to progress.

The legal framework to support the move to e-Government services is not yet in place. Applications and solutions for e-services were tendered and implemented without full legal coverage, therefore some of the e-services might not be used due to this.

Some government entities are tendering and implementing solutions without taking into confederation the EGAF architecture, and other compatibility issues. This will make them stand alone solutions and cannot integrate with other complementary solutions among the government body.

The ICT infrastructure in place is ahead of the capacity to use the infrastructure, and the investment was generous in some areas and minimal in other areas.

The rapid pace of advancement and implementation has given rise to concerns that some initiatives may have resulted in functionality, systems and tools, that are not of sufficiently high standard. We are advised that a big assessment and validation exercise is about to commence to address this issue.

Conclusion

10. These conclusions are based on information provided, and from our observations in the limited time available. The Government’s ICT infrastructure and its use of ICT – existing and planned, is making remarkably good progress, especially considering the constraints faced by the Public Sector. The Ministry and the Sector as a whole is characterized by a lot of good well considered planning and aggressive execution, leading to a lot of accomplishments within a short time frame. These must now be reviewed and consolidated, the required e-government legislation put in place, and the staffing position, particularly at the e-Government program must be addressed to ensure momentum is maintained.

E – Procurement

11. Government procurement is executed via three separate departments: General Supplies Department, General Tendering Department and Joint Procurement Department – for medical supplies. There are plans in progress to merge the three, and the legislation required is under final review before going to Cabinet.

12. Plans are well advanced to procure a world class ICT Procurement System and specifications and the RFP have been prepared. The project has been put on hold because of lack of finance, and also because a review conducted by the World Bank has suggested that there is need for more institutional preparation and analysis to be undertaken before proceeding with ICT systems. Naturally once these issues have been dealt with the implementation of the system should proceed. This procurement has not been included as an intervention.

3. The Detailed Strategic Objectives

The Government of Jordan needs to adopt the following Strategic Objectives:

1. Objective 1 - To integrate all Governments “Composite Systems” (i.e. GFMIS, HRMIS, e – PROC, and IWOMS) into the Government Integrated Resource Management System – GIRMS. The elaboration of the concept is as follows:
Major Private Sector Corporations all invest heavily in large ERP Systems (Enterprise-wide Resource Planning Systems), supplied by the likes of Oracle and SAP – and several other suppliers.

These ERP systems computerize all aspects of company, from its Finance, HR, and Administration, to its Operations (i.e. its “Value Chain”) - and it’s all done in one integrated and unified system. This delivers immense efficiency, cost saving, and competitiveness across the whole corporation.

Here in Jordan there is the opportunity for the Kingdom to become one of the first countries to set up a “Government-wide Integrated Resource Management System – GIRMS”, which would build on the IWOMS (“Integrated Work Management System”), discussed under Pillar 3 above. The objective is to emulate what happens in the Private Sector regarding their ERPs, and thereby also achieve the immense efficiency, cost saving, and competitiveness. So they have their ERP, we have out GIRMS.

The high level diagram of the GIRMS concept is on the next page:

The computerized Government Financial Management System GFMIS, and the computerized HR Management System HRMIS, are both in the course of being implemented. The Integrated Work Management System concept is being proposed under Pillar 3. If accepted, the way is open to knit them all together in one Government wide GIRMS. This would lay the technological and operational foundation for immense efficiency improvements, cost savings, and competitiveness.24 The integration of all these

24 Investigations into how such integration could be achieved have revealed that there is international
individual systems is facilitated and simplified by the use of a piece of recent technology called the Enterprise Service Bus,

2. **Objective 2** - To supply all “Back Office” Support Services, from a “Shared Service Bureau”, which provides services to all MDA’s within in a Sector. Elaboration is as follows.

   - With the ‘Sectorisation’ of Government MDA’s underway the Government will be restructured into approximately 12 -16 Sectors, each containing several MDAs. If nothing is done each MDA will continue to manage its own ‘support functions’, namely Finance, HR, ICT, Transport, Administration etc.
   - In addition it was noted under Pillar 4 – HR, that the overall distribution of jobs between “front office” and “back office” was too heavily loaded in favor of Back Office (possibly 60:40). It was also noted that because Front Office staff provide service delivery and technical advancement, they ‘add value’. Back office staff, while very essential, purely add to the overheads, and the number of these posts should therefore be minimized in order to maximize “overall value for money”
   - One feasible and highly effective way to achieve this needed efficiency is to create a Shared Service Centre. Under such an arrangement all these ‘support’ functions, which are currently housed within each and every institution, would be consolidated into a single “Shared Services Bureau – SSB” – one for each Sector. The SSB now becomes a service provider to “its Clients”, which are the MDA’s in the Sector concerned. The SSBs enter into MOU’s with each ‘client’ which specify minimum service levels to be provided. The SSB uses the GIRMS and its Integrated Work Management System, and so the performance of the SSB is automatically measured monthly. While the concept is simple to understand, implementation is a real challenge on many levels. A detailed feasibility study of the concept is essential.
   - Note also that the Institutional Development Unit IDU, discussed under Pillar 3, could well fall under the framework of Shared Services Bureau.

3. **Objective 3** - Strengthen the NITC – to enable it to fulfill its widening role.

4. **Objective 4** - Ensure that appropriate legislation is in place to provide a secure environment in which to conduct e-bizness transactions

**4. The Strategic Interventions**

The interventions required to deliver on the Objectives are as follows:

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**Intervention 24 – Commission the GIRMS Project**

The GIRMS project should be commissioned ‘hand in glove’ with the Integrated Work Management System (IWOM) Under Pillar 3. The whole design and development of the IWOM system should be carried out with the express intention of integrating it with the GFMIS and the HRMIS.

A technical study to conduct the conceptual design and the proof of concept, and assist in preparing the RFP is required, covering both GIRMS and IWOMS.

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technology, supported in Jordan, which fully supports and simplifies the required integration process. Technologically this integration appears to be an entirely feasible and relatively simple process, and is independent of the original brand / supplier of software.
Thereafter the project can be commissioned and it will simultaneously go hand in hand through the same stages as IWOMS, namely a multi phased activity covering:

- Planning and Selection of Service Provider
- System Design / Prototyping
- System Development and Testing
- Pilot Implementation
- Implementation roll out

This intervention will last a total of approximately 5 years

**Intervention 25 – Shared Services Bureau**

Phase 1 - This starts with a feasibility / ‘proof of concept’ study, including the detailed planning for the whole intervention, and decisions as to which support services are to be provided on a shared basis.

Phase 2 - The execution will need to be carefully coordinated with the ‘Sector’ restructuring, as it would seem to be ideal to conduct this ‘element’ of restructuring, as part and parcel of the Sectorization process. The execution would require setting a properly staffed Project Management Unit to drive the implementation, incorporating a diversity of skill sets. There would need to be close coordination / harmonization between what the GFMIS, HRMIS and IWOMS implementation teams are doing.

**Intervention 26 – Strengthen NITC**

Execute the existing plans to recruit a Government Chief Information Officer (head of NITC) and enhance the capabilities and resources of the NITC, including the planned assimilation of the e – government program. This is in progress

**Intervention 27 – Put in place the necessary Legislation to enable and protect e-Government transactions**

Phase 1 - Conduct a study to identify and draft the legislation that is required.

Phase 2 – Review, approve, enact the Legislation

**Intervention 28 – MOPSD to Construct, Populate and Maintain a data base of key information relating to all MDAs**

The effective coordination of all the forthcoming changes will require MOPSD to gather baseline data on a whole range of elements within each MDA. This data should relate to

- Mandates and Functions
- Laws, Bylaws, Regulations, Instructions
- Strategic Plans
- Staffing Analysis
- Job Descriptions
- Annual Reports and Performance Information
- MOUs and Linkages with other Institutions
- Etc
Pillar 7 - Governance and Legislation

1. Strategic Goal

A Governance structure where

- Roles and responsibilities of the respective layers of Government (Council of Ministers, Ministerial Subcommittees, Sector Committees, Technical Committees, MDA Executive) are well defined and practiced
- Policies, Legislation, and Decisions are developed and implemented in a timely manner
- Politicians and Senior Officials have the requisite knowledge and skills to execute their responsibilities

2. The Situational Analysis

High Level Governance

1. The single biggest factor that has caused delays in the process of Public Sector reform is said to be the frequent changes in Ministers, and to a lesser extent Secretary Generals. For example the MOPSD, including its predecessor institutions, has apparently had six Ministers in five years. This high turnover rate naturally hinders the buildup of strong momentum in all areas of development, including Public Sector Reform.

2. The Cabinet has been inundated with an untenable volume of business and pressure. Some opinion believed that Ministers and Cabinet were getting too involved in detailed Strategy and even Operations of Government, and not focusing predominantly on Policy and Legislation.

3. The response has been for Cabinet to set up a series of Seven Ministerial Subcommittees to deal with the Seven Components of the Executive Plan of Government. While this may have eased the pressure somewhat, the fundamental question remains as to what precisely should be the role of Cabinet, including its Subcommittees, and what should fall into the purview of other subordinate committees or institutions.

4. The Government is moving towards a more manageable Sector based structure. This will give rise to Sector Coordinating Committees, whose mandate will be defined under Pillar 1. It is quite feasible, possibly preferable, that these Coordinating Committees resemble a Board of Directors in the private sector – i.e. containing both Executive and Non Executive members – and with similar powers of Governance. In such case there may be outside stakeholders on the Committee such as the Private Sector, Civil Society, and Development Partners, all bringing technical, managerial and governance skills to the coordination of the Sectors. If such a proposal is made and adopted, the governance of Sectors and their constituent MDAs should be greatly enhanced.

5. It was noted that there is no ‘handbook’ for Ministers, which sets out the complete structure and institutions of Government, its governance arrangements including committees and institutions, and the specific roles and responsibilities of Ministers compared with those of Secretaries.

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25 The Executive Directors are full time senior employees of the Company. Non Executive Directors represent the Shareholders, as well as bring in ‘independent’ technical expertise which is capable of validating or questioning the actions of the Executive Directors.
General. Such a handbook would be useful in inducting new Ministers into the Cabinet, as well as providing a source of reference for existing Ministers and senior Public Servants.

Legislation

6. Jordan is well served by a plethora of legislation (constitution, laws, bylaws, as well as regulations and instructions) governing the institutions and functions of the Public Sector, and each Ministry, Government Agency and Autonomous Agency has its own governing law or bylaw. In addition there are several cross cutting bylaws directly impacting the functions and operations of Government, the most noteworthy of relevance to this assignment being
   - Civil Service By Law
   - Service Delivery improvement Bylaw
   - Public Sector Development and Governmental Performance By Law
   - Financial Management Bylaw
   - Procurement – 3 Bylaws
   - Code of Conduct Statement
   - Corruption Law
   - Privatization Law
   - Public Administration Law
   - Planning and Budgeting Law

7. This assignment has only considered those laws directly related to Public Sector Reform, and generally found that laws are adequate, some more so than others, even if sometimes there are some issues not addressed. In addition there are sometimes overlaps, for example sections in the law covering Public Sector Development and Governmental Performance, there are distinct overlaps with the Civil Service By Law. This is acceptable provided there are no conflicts.

8. In the course of this assignment, a number of interventions and recommendations have been proposed across the “7 Pillar Framework” which will give rise to the need to amend the following:
   - Civil Service By Law
   - Service Delivery By Law
   - Public Sector Development and Governmental Performance By Law

9. In addition there are several instances where new laws will need to be promulgated to give force and effect to the interventions proposed. These instances are noted where they arise in the Interventions.

3. The Detailed Strategic Objectives

The Government of Jordan needs to adopt the following Strategic Objectives:

10. The Cabinet’s role and responsibilities are restricted to
    - Policy formulation and review,
    - the preparation of Bills to govern new policies
    - the high level monitoring of progress towards achieving the short term Executive Plan of Government,
    - the high level monitoring of progress towards achieving the longer term National Agenda.

11. The full Cabinet is supported by a series of Committees including
    - Cabinet Subcommittees, who deal with the specific Policy and Strategy issues within its Sectoral remit / jurisdiction, and make the related recommendations to Cabinet
The Subcommittees are in turn supported by respective Technical Committees, who deal with the technical, operational and implementation issues of policy and strategy that relate to the Sector.

A decision therefore needs to be made as to where the future Sector Coordinating Committee fits. On balance it would seem to fit the role of Technical Committee – with an oversight role of Strategy and Operations, including Performance, Risk Management, and any key unresolved issues.

12. All Committees – (Cabinet, or Cabinet Subcommittees, or Sector Coordinating / Technical Committees) are provided with well prepared, properly structured “information packs and briefing papers” to support all the agenda items, which enables the Committee to conduct their business expeditiously and efficiently. 26 In addition:

- All other issues on the agenda should be supported by short ‘briefing papers’ which summarize the core elements of the issue, and make the related recommendations.
- All Committees then make maximum use of communications technology, in this case video conferencing, to have technical people standing by remotely to explain any issue, answer questions, and facilitate expeditious decision making.

13. All new Ministers and Parliamentarians are fully cognizant of their Roles and Responsibilities attaching to their new appointment / office.

**Legislation**

All policies and institutions in the Public Sector are given force and effect by well considered, well structured, complete and precisely drafted laws, regulations and standards. 27

4. **The Strategic Interventions**

The interventions required to deliver on the Objectives are as follows:

*Intervention 29 - Preparation of a Ministerial Handbook*

Commission a study to prepare a handbook on the differing roles, responsibilities and functions of:

- Cabinet
- Ministerial Subcommittees
- Technical Committees /Sectoral Coordinating Committees
- Ministers
- Secretaries General

The same activity should also study the information needs of each Committee, and design a standardized ‘information pack’ for each Committee, including a standard format for briefing papers. Other topics could include the GOJ standardized approach to setting Policy and formulating Strategy.

*Intervention 30 – Video Conferencing*

Investment needs to be made in video conferencing technology.

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26 Note that one of the Big Issues – which is the ‘Performance’ of each constituent Ministry / Agency, is taken care of by the ‘Integrated Work Management System’. This provides each Institution’s ‘performance score’, discussed in Pillar 3.

27 Note: By and large the Government of Jordan appears to meet this requirement, and the Legislative Process and its Procedures have not been cause for undue concern. Generally speaking it is not shortcomings in the Law which has held up Reform.
PART 4 – KEY RISKS AND CRITICAL SUCCESS FACTORS

1. The approach to this section is to identify the keys risks that could derail successful implementation. Some have already appeared in the technical pillar section, some are new as they are ‘cross cutting’ The list of risks is as follows:

Previously Mentioned:
- High Turnover of Ministers and Agency Heads
- No Binding Authority
- Surplus Staff

New Crosscutting Risks
- Too Ambitious – Too Much Change
- Inadequate Communication, Lack of Understanding of the Reforms, Lack of Full Commitment, Resistance to Change
- Inadequate Change Management
- Lack of adequate human resource base with requisite professional and management skills to implement the comprehensive reform.
- Inadequate Budgets

The Risks and their proposed mitigation are described below. Note that several of the risks give rise to the need for another ‘Intervention’ during implementation, and these are numbered

High Turnover of Ministers and Agency Heads:

2. There is an extremely high level of frequent turnover at the minister and agency head levels making continuity and consistency of policy and policy implementation difficult to achieve. It is very difficult, though not entirely impossible, to achieve lasting reforms in such an environment. In the MOPSD alone there have been 5 ministers in the past 5 years.

No Binding Authority:

3. Experience in implementing any major change in many jurisdictions around the world, has shown that without legal backing most reform program have difficulty in gaining momentum and taking root. Jordan has experienced similar difficulties where for example the MOPSD has not had legal authority to obligate public institutions to adopt the recommended reforms to improve the delivery of services. Therefore a key recommendation is for the government to create the necessary legal instrument to compel public institutions, where necessary, to submit to and adopt the reforms relating to their mandates, structures and operations.

Surplus Staff

4. Successful reforms are intended to create a new vibrancy, and new commitment to performance in Institutions, and a change in culture. If done correctly, the implementation of the proposed interventions, may give rise to staff who have little useful purpose to serve. If such staff are left in their posts with little to do, then this budding and important new spirit
may be dampened, even snuffed out, before it is allowed to flourish. It is therefore important to have acceptable arrangements in place to handle such situations.

5. The mitigation is that such staff could be offered financially attractive early retirement, or possibly transferred to a government institution which is tasked with creating labor intensive, low cost projects (but nevertheless useful) to absorb this surplus staff - possibly in the arena of community development, environmental improvement etc.

**New Cross Cutting Risks – The Reform is Too Ambitious involving too Much Change**

6. There could be concern that the reform program is too ambitious involving too much change too soon. This is a key issue a that needs to be carefully considered, and carefully managed. The following considerations apply.

7. With the exception of the Integrated Work Management System IWOMS, (and its sister interventions - Performance Related Pay and GIRMS), all the interventions are already in Government’s existing reform plans in some form or another, and have been for some time. The question therefore is, ‘is IWOMS taking the Government of Jordan a ‘bridge too far”? This is a key issue and risk.

8. Its mitigation is as follows. The IWOM system will be implemented into respective MDAs on an “On Demand” basis. This will involve each MDA having to ‘prequalify’ itself by passing a “Readiness Assessment”.

9. The Readiness Assessment will involve the MDA having already put ‘its house in order’ in several important respects. i.e. it will have

   - Restructured, and optimized its Manning levels
   - Implemented the new HRMIS, and have its Human Resource function in order
   - Implemented the new GFMIS and have its Budgeting / Financial Management function in order
   - Determined its minimum standards of Service Delivery, and started implementing Service Delivery Improvement initiatives

10. In other words the MDA concerned will already be robust, and its Institutional capacity will already have been greatly enhanced. It will have gone through much change (getting fit and strong in the process), and will be ready for the next round – especially as this is the round that brings the reward of Performance Pay with it. This is critical.

11. In addition the Readiness assessment must not only cover ‘Technical Readiness’, it must also cover Institutional Capacity for more change. If this capacity is not there yet, then that MDA’s implementation will be deferred. So the end result is that this final phase of change is not forced on any MDA, they each have to be ‘ready, willing and able’.

12. If this means that some MDA’s are only ready in 6-7 years, so be it – that is not a problem. What is important is that the Vision of the Future has been set, and a steady pace is attained in getting there - but only when MDA’s are individually ready. This will make the amount of change digestible and manageable.

**Inadequate Communication, Lack of Understanding of the Reforms, Lack of Full Commitment, Resistance to Change**

13. A common experience is that reform outcomes are usually disappointing and fail to meet expectations where care had not been taken to develop and execute a comprehensive
communication strategy, involving all the stakeholder groups at the outset of the program, followed by a steady stream of updated communications.

14. Politicians, The Cabinet, and the Senior Management of all the Government Agencies must be well briefed in manageable group sizes, before the formal launch of the program. They must be sensitized to the need for reform, their role, and all the major positives that will ensue, for individuals and the county. Fortunately, because of the substantial Performance Pay element, there generally will be good news for most people. The full commitment of all key stakeholders and managers must be sought as it is vital.

15. Thereafter an active and ongoing Communications and Public Relations campaign is essential, not only to Public Servants but to the Public itself, to publicize progress, achievements and benefits, and build widespread support and momentum.

The development of the Nationwide Communications Strategy, and assistance with its implementation, may well require the support of a professional Public Relations and Communications Firm. This Communications Initiative is incorporated as Intervention 31 in the Implementation Plan.

**Inadequate Change Management**

16. The execution of this strategy and the implementation of the 33 Interventions is going to bring about an unparalleled ‘step change’ within the Public Service. If the major changes are not extremely well managed the reform process may well limp along and deliver below par results. The recommendation to ensure this does not happen is for an “Institutional Development Unit” IDU to be set up for each Sector, forming a key part of the ‘Shared Services Bureau’ recommended under Pillar 6. The Units need to be staffed by competent professionals who are made responsible for ensuring that all interventions relevant to their sectors are fully implemented, changes are made, and new systems and procedures are fully adhered to (see “Assessment Centre” concept below for process of selecting the most appropriate staff). They will have a direct reporting line to their SGs (or equivalent), but initially they will have a strong dotted line reporting the Program Task force in MOPSD. It will be important for at least 2 – 3 people in each unit to have formal ‘change management’ training, as well as a range of other training needs which will emerge as the program progresses. This training program is listed as Intervention 32 – Change Management & Skills Development.

**Lack of adequate human resource base with requisite professional and management skills to implement the comprehensive reform.**

17. Implementing the proposed reforms will require many qualified professionals and experienced managers, to staff the “Institutional Development Units” IDUs, who at present may be lacking in sufficient numbers. This is a key constraint. Fortunately the Government has the mechanism of hiring “Contract Staff” to mitigate the problem, as well as the opportunity to reassign ‘good performers’ from the Sector MDAs into the IDU. Early on in the detailed planning of the implementation process, an assessment must be done of the number of Contract Staff and the identification of staff for ‘redeployment” that will be needed for the IDUs. It could conceivably run close to a hundred or more.

18. That being the case the Government should consider contracting a reputable HR and Training Consultancy Firm to develop an “Assessment Centre” to assist in identifying the right professionals and staff with the right attributes, skills and experiences, who are capable perform well in the IDU. Having the ‘right people’ with the right capability in the IDUs is an essential requirement for success of the reform strategy.
19. An Assessment Centre involves applicants (and potential redeployment candidates) participating in a 2-3 day assessment exercise, mostly conducted in groups. Applicants complete a series of tests, exercises, role plays and interviews etc., under observation of an “observer panel”. These exercises are all designed to focus on the skills and attributes needed to succeed in the program, and they determine which candidates have the right attributes and skills to perform well in an IDU role. This “Assessment Centre Initiative” is incorporated as Intervention 33 in the Implementation Plan.

Inadequate Budgets

20. The reform program is designed to bring about “step change”, and modernization is going to require very large budgets. However the benefit of succeeding should be to add between 1 – 2% to Jordan’s rate of economic growth that would otherwise have occurred. Very roughly, 2% extra growth on the 2009 GDP figure of JD 16.3 bn, would add JD 325 mil to GDP, taxed at 20% average, gives a potential indicative tax revenue of an additional JD 65 mil annually. This will of course grow annually, at which stage discounted cash flows, inflation and other complex issues have to be factored in.

21. Nevertheless the overall message is that the annual and cumulative benefit will be enormous, and that Government needs to ensure that the necessary budgets to fully succeed are made available. The common approach of “this is all there is, spread it around and make do” should be avoided if at all possible. The step change is going to be expensive, but it will generate handsome net returns in the medium and long term and will be a highly rewarding investment economically, socially, and culturally. Indeed the investment is absolutely vital if Jordan wishes to be included amongst the ‘Winning’ Nations, as ‘Globalization’ divides the world into Winners and Losers over the next decade.

NEXT STEPS

22. This Draft Report needs to be reviewed and discussed by the various stakeholders in Public Sector Development, i.e. the MOPSD, The PSD Committee and others. Once the Interventions have been refined and approved the Consultant will then prepare:

- Budgets, and budget breakdowns for all the interventions, including the annual budget spread
- A detailed implementation plan and time lines for all the interventions
- An implementation Organization Structure
- Next Steps in the Implementation process.
APPENDIX 1 - PUBLIC SECTOR DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES: HISTORY AND PROFILE

Public sector development initiatives have a long history in Jordan, as the first Jordanian governments recognized the importance of having good public administration to realize economic, social, and political development. In this respect, Jordanian governments adopted several initiatives which focused mostly on creating an efficient, effective, and accountable public sector. The main related initiatives launched in Jordan can be summarized as follows:

- 1984: Royal Committee of Administrative Development
- 1999: Public Sector Reform Committee (1st phase)
- 2002: Public Sector Modernization and Development Program (1st phase)
- 2006: Ministry of Public Sector Development

In spite of the importance of such initiatives and efforts made in the field of public sector development, they did not meet the expectations due to a number of challenges, mainly:

- Lack of stable institutionalized development, resulting in quick turnover of leaderships assigned to implement development programs, and changing polices and directions depending on persons responsible for public sector development programs
- Poor accountability in terms of compliance with public sector development programs and performance of all ministries and institutions
- Lack of support provided to public sector development programs, considering this issue of secondary importance
- Limited powers vested in bodies concerned with public sector development
- Poor compliance with change and reform concepts, and resistance of some decision-makers to modernization and development efforts.

Public Sector Development Program (2004-2009)

In 2004, the government adopted a document on public sector reform policies called “Towards Better Public Administration to Realize Better Results 2004-2009”. Such document was approved by the cabinet on 10/18/2004.

Based upon such document, a public sector development program was developed comprising 8 components as follows:

1. Restructure and reorganize public institutions
2. Improve quality of public services and simplify public procedures
3. Manage and develop human resources
4. Support setting policies and decision-making process
5. Follow up with public performance
6. Develop financial management
7. Program management
8. Communication and awareness.
A ministerial committee called Ministerial Committee for Public Sector Development was formed and tasked with the following duties:\textsuperscript{28}:

- Review and approve public sector development policies and strategies
- Define implementation priorities of related programs and projects according to the plans set
- Consider amendments of legislation governing public sector performance
- Consider payroll and remuneration system of the public sector in the light of the studies developed for this purpose by the concerned bodies
- Ensure highest degree of coordination among different administrative, financial, e-government, and training public development and modernization, etc. projects, so that they can serve the Public Sector Development Program (PSDP)
- Consider recommendations and directions made by MOPSD and others, as well as experience of other public institutions on public services; and take measures aiming to develop and roll out such experience
- Follow up with implementation of policies and programs through periodical progress reports to be submitted by MOPSD.

Out of the policy document and Public Sector Development Program a strategic program plan (SPP) was developed. SPP included all programs and projects to be implemented to realize PSDP objectives during the period of 2005-2009. Such plan was approved by the Ministerial Committee for Public Sector Development on 4/3/2006.

**MOPSD was established in 2006**

This was done under the Administrative Organization Regulation No. 12 of 2006. The ministry was tasked to implement 5 main components of PSDP, namely:

1. Restructure and reorganize public institutions
2. Improve quality of public services and simplify public procedures
3. Manage and develop human resources
4. Program management
5. Communication and awareness

A new Administrative Organization Regulation No. 54 of 2007 was issued for MOPSD, under which the ministry was tasked with supervision and implementation of 3 main dimensions:

1. Develop organizational structures
2. Simplify procedures and improve public services
3. Human resource development and management policies

A number of achievements were realized under PSDP and other following programs. Annex 1 shows a summary of such achievements and obstacles which faced their implementation in the past.

\textsuperscript{28} The committee was reestablished several times. The duties mentioned in this document are related to the committee formed on 12/16/2008.
APPENDIX 2 - OFFICIALS INTERVIEWED

Imad Fakhoury, Minister, MOPSD

Marwan Juma.  Minister, MOICT

Mazen S. Al-Saket, President, Civil Service Bureau

Badreih Bilibisi Director, HR Policy Development MOPSD

Mohammed Al-Dwari, Director, Streamlining Department MOPSD

Sana Saleem Khair, Director Service Delivery Department MOPSD

Siham Ahamad Al-Khawaldch, Streamlining Department MOPSD

Nedal Tawfiq Mas’ad, Service Delivery Department MOPSD

Yousef Abu Shaar, Director, Service Delivery Improvement Unit, Ministry of Education

Osama Al-Azzam, Budget Advisor, DAI

Khalid Al Hmoud – Economic Policy Analysis DAI

Mustafa Al-Barari, President, Audit Bureaucratic

Mowafaq Al-Hajaj, Director, Monitoring and Evaluation Unit, MOSPD

Khalid Al-Hmoud, DAI

Bilal Khalil Alkafawin, Manager of Challenge Fund, MOPSD
Alaeddin Armouti, Ombudsman Assistant, Ombudsman Bureau

Waleed Farhan, Executive Director, Government Performance Administration

Yasera Ghosheh, Executive Director, King Abdullah II Center for Excellence

Reem Hoseh, Director of Scholarship and Training Directorate, Civil Service Bureau

Osama Jaradat, Director General, National Institute for Training

Loay Munir Sehwail, Director, Industrial Development Directorate, MOIT

Nader Thneibat, Director, E-Government Program, MOICT

Dina A Dabbas, Secretary General, Executive Privatisation Commission

Mahmoud Hyati, Deputy Director Department of National Supplies
APPENDIX 3 - LIST OF THE GOVERNMENT AVAILABLE E-SERVICES:

الديوان الإلكتروني
البلاغات الخاصة بالوزارات
البلاغات المعممة
مشروع الحكومة الإلكترونية
البريد الإلكتروني

دائرة العطاءات الحكومية
خدمة البيب المباشر للعطاءات المركزية
خدمة الاستعلام عن طريق الهاتف النقال
المقاولون المصنفون حسب الاسم والرقم
المقاولون المصنفون حسب الاختصاص
المستشارون المؤهلون حسب الاسم والرقم

دائرة ضريبة الدخل والمبيعات
الجمارك الأردنية
الاستعلام عن الكفالات البنكية
الاستعلام عن المعاملات الجمركية لشركات التخليص
الاستفسار عن الأمانات الجمركية
الاستفسار عن الرسوم الجمركية للسيارات
نظام الإدخال المؤقت
نظام الاستفسار عن المعاملات الجمركية
نظام التعرفة الجمركية المتكاملة

وزارة الصناعة والتجارة
تسجيل و استعلام مؤسسات فردية
تسجيل و استعلام أسماء تجارية
البحث عن اسم عامة
العلامات التجارية موزعة حسب الأصناف
مركز تكنولوجيا المعلومات الوطني
تتبع البعثات الالكترونية
دائرة الأراضي والمساحة

تقديم معلومات خرائطية مساحية - مخطط أراضي
تقديم معلومات خرائطية مساحية - بيان التغيير
تقديم معلومات خرائطية مساحية - فهرس أراضي

المؤسسة العامة للإسكان والتطوير الحضري

خدمة الرسائل القصيرة
خدمة تقديم طلب استقدام من مشاريع المياه الملكية
خدمةسكن كريم لعيش كريم

مجلس النواب الأردني

جداول الأعمال لجلسات مجلس النواب
محاضر الجلسات لمجلس النواب الأردني

ديوان التشريع والرأي

نظام التشريعات

دائرة الإفتاء العام

محول التاريخ

البحث في القوانين
إرسال سوالك
حساب الزكاة

التدريب المهني

منظمة التعليم والتعليم الإلكترونية
هيئة التأمين
تقديم استفسار
البريد الأردني
تبع البعثات الإلكترونية
APPENDIX 4 - LIST OF SERVICE DELIVERY IMPROVEMENT PROJECTS UNDERTAKEN, AND IN PROGRESS & LIST OF METHODOLOGIES DEVELOPED

COMPLETED:
1. Ministry of Interior – Renewal of Passports and Birth Certificates – enabled through the Post Office
3. Ministry of Interior - Vehicle Inspection – Set up of Mobile Inspection Units to conduct on site inspections for owners of large vehicle fleets
5. Land and survey department: improving land subdivision service
8. Ministry of health: record for Chronic diseases treatment
11. Central Customer complaints unit

IN PROGRESS:
1. Amman Municipality - Comprehensive Health Centers – ‘One stop shop approach’ Queue and Flow Sequences
2. Ministry of Public Works & Housing – Housing and Urban Development – Splitting up of Land Titles, and Land Surveys
3. Amman Municipality – Housing and Urban Development – Issuing Ownership Certificates
4. Ministry of Interior - Civil Status and Passport Department - ‘One stop shop approach’ to applying for all ‘Personal Certificates – To be rolled out to 10 regional offices.

METHODOLOGIES DEVELOPED
5. Customers service offices - Guidelines were developed to support all customers service offices at all public institutions based on international good practices - launched in 2010.
6. Complaint management system guideline were developed and launched in 2010 in order to support all public institutions to deal with complaints.
7. Central government complaint system and call centre was launched and the central complaint unit was established in 2010. The purpose of this system is to manage all the complaints and build a knowledge base of improvement plan for all the services
8. Toolkit for service delivery improvement guidelines has been developed and rolled out on the web site of the Ministry. These guidelines were based on international best practices.

1. Several workshops on tools and techniques of the above mentioned toolkit were conducted to all related employees at public institutions in Jordan.
## APPENDIX 5 – PERMANENT ESTABLISHMENT – SPLIT BETWEEN TECHNICAL & ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF

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